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PREFACE
The Joint University Program for Air Transportation Research is a coordinated set of
three grants sponsored by NASA Langley Research Center and the Federal Aviation
Administration, one each with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (NGL-22-009-
640), Ohio University (NGR-36-009-017), and Princeton University (NGL-31-001-252).
The research conducted under these grants, which were instituted in 1971, focus on the
strengths of each institution. The goals of this program are consistent with the aeronautical
interests of both NASA and the FAA in furthering the safety and efficiency of the National
Airspace System. The continued development of the National Airspace System, however,
requires advanced technology from a variety of disciplines, especially in the areas of
computer science, navigation, guidance, and control theory, aircraft performance, flight
dynamics, communications, and human factors. The Joint University Program (JUP) was
created to provide new methods for interdisciplinary education which would develop
researchers for solving these large scale problems. Under the JUP, each university
submits a separate proposal yearly which is dealt with individually by NASA and FAA. At
the completion of each research task, a comprehensive and detailed report is issued for
distr!bution to the program participants. Typically, this is a thesis that fulfills the
requlrements for an advanced degree or a report describing an undergraduate research
project. Also, papers are submitted to technical conferences and archival journals. These
papers document the research accomplished under the JUP for national and international
audiences.
To promote technical interchange among the students, periodic reviews are held at the
schools and at a NASA or FAA facility. The 1993-1994 year-end review was held at Ohio
University, Athens, Ohio, July 14-15, 1994. At these reviews the program participants,
both graduate and undergraduate, have an opportunity to present their research activities to
their peers, to professors, and to invited guests from government and industry.
This conference publication represents the thirteenth in a series of yearly summaries of
the program. (The 1992-1993 summary appears in NASA CP-3246, DOT/FAA/CT-
94/03). Most of the material is the effort of students supported by the research grants.
Four types of contributions are included in this publication: a summary of ongoing
research relevant to the Joint University Program is presented by each principal
investigator, completed works are represented by full technical papers, research previously
in the open literature (e.g., theses or journal articles) is presented in an annotated
bibliography, and status reports of ongoing research are represented by copies of
presentations with accompanying text.
Use of trade names of manufacturers in this report does not constitute an official
endorsement of such products or manufacturers, either expressed or implied, by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration or the Federal Aviation Administration.
Richard M. Hueschen
NASA Langley Research Center
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SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
1. INTRODUCTION
There are two completed projects and two continuing research
activities under the sponsorship of the FAA/NASA Joint University Program
as the 1993-94 period ends. There were a number of publications during the
year which are referenced in this report. A brief summary of the continuing
research projects is provided.
The completed project was:
1. Alhanatis, Robert - Analysis of Aircraft Surface Motion at Boston
Logan International Airport, MIT Flight Transportation Laboratory
Report, FTL 94-5, June 1994:
2. Achtmann, Eric - A State of the Art Review and Critical Analysis of
World Jet Transport Safety and Aviation Fire Safety (to be published).
The active research projects are:
1. ASLOTS - An Interactive Adaptive System for Automated Approach
Spacing of Aircraft - Husni Idris.
2. Alerting in Automated and Datalink Capable Cockpits- James Kuchar.
2. REVIEW OF CONTINUING RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
2.1 Human-Centered Automation of ATC Operations in the Terminal Area
by Husni Indris, Flight Transportation Laboratory
This research is concerned with development of an interactive decision
support system for ATC controllers responsible for arrivals and departures in
a busy terminal area. It is focused on a concept called "ASLOTS" for
interactive, adaptive spacing of aircraft on final approach to landing as
described in last year's report, but has broadened its scope during the last year
to be concerned with techniques and methods for Human-Centered
Automation of all operations in a busy terminal area which has arrival and
departures at multiple airports and runways.
In this year, a review of possible techniques has been conducted, and a
paradigm developed for 10 different levels of possible automation based on
task allocation. Techniques reviewed are: Knowledge-based Control,
Adaptive Control, Learning Control, NeuroControl, Fuzzy Control, and
Optimal Control. As a result of this review, a hybrid intelligent control
4
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structure has been developed for ASLOTS where each task can be kept
manual or automated to several degrees independently from other tasks. The
current specific research goals are now:
1. Implement the automation of the path generation task.
2. Implement automatic Conformance Monitoring
3. Investigate making the reference model for ASLOTS path generation
to be adaptive.
4. Create a Rule-Base for the Automated Path Generation & Conformance
Monitoring.
5. Introduce fuzzy-logic at points in the Rule-Base.
6. Allow the Rule-Base to interact with the Slot Marker status, and study
the associated Human Factors.
The work on developing ATCSIM the simulation capability for air and
ground motion has continued. The current ASLOTS logic has been
incorporated into the air module, and a ground surface simulation for both
Frankfurt and Boston Logan can now be run simultaneously with the
airspace operations.
2.2 A Unified Framework for the Evaluation of Hazard Alerting Systems
by Jim Kuchar, Aeronautical Systems Laboratory
Given the increasingly complex environment in which aircraft
operate, the management of information on the flight deck has become a
major issue affecting flight safety. One major component of the modern
cockpit is comprised of several alerting systems which have been developed
to monitor flight safety and warn the flight crew of potential hazards.
Warning systems have seen a rapid growth in complexity, both in terms of
the extent of information which now may be used and also in the methods by
which alerts may be presented to the crew. To understand these complex
system issues, a framework is required that outlines the major issues
involved in alerting system performance and that may be applied to various
types of alerting systems to evaluate their effectiveness. This paper outlines
research that is being conducted toward the development of a generalized
framework that can be applied to the design or evaluation of alerting systems.
2.2.1 Problem Statement
The evolution of the aircraft flight deck has seen an enormous increase
in the amount of information available to the pilot about the environment
around the aircraft. In order to manage this information efficiently, current
design philosophy follows the 'dark cockpit' concept where the pilot has easy
access to the data required to fly and navigate the aircraft without being
overloaded by extraneous information. Alerting systems have been
incorporated into cockpit design as a means by which potential hazards may
be monitored silently. Only when an obstacle poses a certain level of risk is
the flight crew notified that a potential threat exists. Because they are a
sudden intrusion into the 'dark cockpit', alerts are generally treated very
seriously and false alarms may reduce crew confidence in the system. For this
reason, it is important that alerting systems be designed with care, providing a
necessary level of safety while keeping nuisance alerts to a minimum.
Alerting systems on modern aircraft are generally the product of an ad
hoc, evolutionary process. Warning systems have historically been added in
response to accidents, and incrementally modified when system performance
failed to maintain certain safety standards. Modifications have also been
made when a system behaved in an overly-conservative manner, resulting in
an unacceptable rate of nuisance alerts.
As more information is made available to the cockpit for use in
alerting flight crews to threats, the complexity of the alerting systems has
grown. Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS), for example, have seen
several incremental enhancements. Starting with simple altitude call-outs,
sink rate and terrain closure rate warnings were added using radar altimeter
data, along with different alerting criteria dependent upon aircraft
configuration. Effort is now being applied toward incorporating three-
dimensional data from a sensor or database [Bateman, personal
communication, 8/93]. As complexity increases, the tradeoffs between
providing adequate time to react and being overly conservative become
increasingly difficult to manage since changes in system parameters in one
area of the alerting system may have large impacts on another area.
In order to efficiently design and evaluate alerting systems, a
framework is required that may be used to identify those areas most sensitive
to changes in design parameters. Research in the MIT Aeronautical Systems
Lab identifies and develops the major issues affecting alerting system
performance, and provides a methodology that may be used to evaluate
system effectiveness. While alerting systems have historically been created in
response to specific problem areas, the research investigates alerting systems
in a generalized manner, providing a single framework which may be applied
to many specific types of hazard alerting.
2.2.2 Approach
1.2.2.1 Identification of Salient System Components
Although alerting systems are designed and implemented to protect
against specific hazards, a generalized model may be developed that provides
insight into the interrelationships between system components. Figure 1 is a
control system view of the principal elements of a generalized hazard
situation with an alerting system. As shown, there are four main blocks in
the control loop: Measurement Sources, Alerting System, Human Operator,
and Encounter Dynamics.
Continuing the control system analogy, a state-space representation of a
hazard encounter is used. The vector x represents the complete set of states
that define the dynamics of a hazard encounter. In a terrain alerting system
application, for example, x might include altitude, descent rate, airspeed, and
flap and gear settings. The Measurement Sources block represents the sensors
that provide estimates of the states in x to the rest of the system. Some of this
information is passed directly to the operator through displays and other non-
alert sources, and other data are used by the alerting system to determine if an
alert is warranted. The alerting system classifies the situation into one of
several levels of severity and issues alert information when appropriate. The
operator uses the information from the alerting system and other sources to
make necessary control inputs to the encounter dynamics. Other information
from training, previous experience, established operating procedures, and the
environment may also affect the operator's response. Control inputs and
uncertainties in the encounter dynamics affect the evolving state vector, x,
which is available to the measurement sources as the loop repeats.
The generalized structure of Figure I enables it to be applied to
situations where the operator is controlling one vehicle (e.g., the pilot of an
aircraft) and to cases where the operator provides instructions to many
vehicles (e.g., an air traffic controller). In addition, the framework may be
applied to single-hazard situations or to multiple-hazard encounters and to
systems with one or several alerting systems.
Table la) Crew Response
Since the end goal of an alerting system is to provide the crew with
enough information to avoid a hazard, flight crew reaction is an important
consideration. Crew response to an alert is a function of several parameters.
The type of display and the quality of data and method of display depiction
affect the crew's impression of the severity of the hazard as well as potential
escape maneuvers, as has been shown in several simulation studies [Kuchar
& Hansman, 1991, 1993]. Crew alertness and training also may have a strong
impact on the response. For example, aggressive windshear avoidance
training was started in the late 1980% contributing in part to eliminate
windshear-related accidents since 1986 [Bateman, 1991]. In addition, a history
of previously-encountered nuisance alerts may decrease crew response to the
threat. Numerous Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents have been
attributed to "delayed GPWS response syndrome" [DeCelles, 1991], where
flight crews delayed their reaction to an executive "Pull Up!" alert, due in part
to past exposure to nuisance alerts.
Measurement Alerting System Human Encounter
Sources Operator Dynamics
Alert Threshold
Criteria
T F
_" _ U
Alerting System = Vehicle -_
_. Measurements Alerting Yd
Ga Display _ x ,.._
u_¢) D I I -
_=,..,to x H I IHazard1 -to f0
1
o _, Hazard 2 I-oo f_
Nominal 1
._, Information Yn
_ Gn • ,
° lJ=_ Hazard n
' _ e
Noise _,
System
Uncertainties
b) Alert Thresholds
In a typical alerting system, measurements of a hazard are compared
against a set of alerting thresholds to determine whether an alert needs to be
issued. However, uncertainties may be present that make a clear distinction
between a hazard and a non-hazard difficult. Therefore, the system cannot
determine with absolute certainty whether a given situation really warrants
an alert. Rather, there is some probability that the situation is truly
hazardous, and some probability that it is not.
Given a hazard measurement, the output of an alerting system may be
considered to be a deterministic event: either an alert is issued or it is not._
Since the alerting system's decision may or may not reflect the true situation,
however, there are four possible outcomes of any single-stage alerting
decision, as shown in Table 1. If a situation is truly hazardous, an alert is
considered to be necessary and is termed a Correct Detection, CD (or true-
positive in signal detection theory). Similarly, a failure to alert when a
situation is non-hazardous is Correct Rejection, CR (or true-negative). An
alert that is issued in a non-hazardous situation is a False Alarm, FA, and
likewise, failure to alert to a truly hazardous situation is a Missed Detection,
MD.
Alerting System Decision Outcomes
True Situation
Non-Hazard Hazard
Alert Not CR: Correct Rejection MD: Missed Detection
Issued (True-Negative) (False-Negative)
Alert Issued FA: False Alarm CD: Correct Detection
(False-Positive) (True-Positive)
More insight may be gained by examining this problem from a
mathematical standpoint. Given a hazard level measurement, y, the alerting
system makes a mutually exclusive decision: alert or do not alert. The true
situation, however, may or may not warrant an alert, and can be treated
probabilistically. Accordingly, H is defined as an event in which an alert is
needed -- the true situation is hazardous. The probability that the situation is
hazardous, given the measurement y, is then denoted Pr(H I y), read
"probability of H occurring, given y'.
1 Note that in signal detection theory, the true situation is typically treated as deterministic and the
measurementis consideredto be a randomvariable. In thisdiscussion, however, the measurementwill
be considered known deterministically and the true situationis treatedas a random variable.
An example graph of Pr(H I y) for an alerting system is shown in
Figure 2. The Figure also overlays an alerting threshold: measured hazard
levels greater than the threshold produce alerts, and measurements less than
the threshold do not. The height of the curve at a given measurement, y,
shows the probability that the situation warrants an alert. The four outcome
regions (CD, FA, MD, CR) are also shown. For the sample measurement in
the Figure, no alert is issued because the measurement is less than the alert
threshold. The value of Pr(H I y) at that value of y is therefore the probability
of a missed detection, Pr(MD). The value above the Pr(H I y) curve is the
probability that the situation is truly not hazardous, Pr(CR).
Similar behavior occurs when the measurement is greater than the
threshold. There will exist a probability of correct detection, Pr(CD), as well as
a probability of false alarm, Pr(FA).
Threshold
No Alert Alert
1
[] False Alarm
,._ _ Correct Detection
["] Correct Rejection
_] Missed Detection
Pr(MD) :
0 _Y
Measurement MeasuredHazard Level
Figure 2: Alerting System Decision Outcomes
Example curve of Pr(H I y) with alerting
threshold
Measured value > threshold: alert issued
Measured value < threshold: no alert
issued
Errors in the alerting decision are generally caused by one or more of
three factors. First, due to sensor errors the threat may be measured as inside
the given threshold when in reality it is outside the threshold (or vice versa).
Second, the threshold itself may be designed in an overly conservative
manner -- leading to warnings for targets which do not actually pose a threat.
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Finally, the extrapolation of the threat's trajectory may be in error if complete
information is not available regarding its intended flight path.
Improvements in one of these three areas may affect the others. For
example, increasing sensor accuracy may allow the system designer to use less
conservative thresholds. A comparable effect might be achieved, for example,
through datalink of an intruder's intended flight path, providing the alerting
system with better information with which to extrapolate the hazard's
trajectory.
c) Multi-Stage Alerting
Many alerting systems currently use a two-stage approach: a potential
threat is first highlighted and presented to the flight crew as an advisory
caution so that the crew has time to determine whether the threat warrants
action. Should the threat persist until corrective action is required, a warning
is issued that generally should be followed without hesitation.
It has been observed that crews tend to have low tolerances for false
alarms at the warning level, and higher tolerances for false alarms at the
cautionary level since a reaction is not mandated [Boucek, personal
communication, 2/94]. Therefore, cautionary alerts can be used to identify
low-probability potential threats and allow the crew an opportunity to
evaluate the situation. Warnings, though, are designed to alert only to high-
probability threats when immediate action is needed.
2.2.2.2 Development of Methodology for Estimation of Threshold
Effectiveness
The research has also involved the development of a methodology
that can be used to estimate the probability of an encounter with a hazard,
denoted Pr(E). The methodology is developed in a generalized fashion,
allowing it to be extended to a wide variety of hazard encounter situations.
The methodology begins by developing a method for modeling the
aircraft and hazard as appropriate to the situation. For example, in a Traffic
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) application, the aircraft and
threat might be modeled as cylinders or spheres. Additional modeling
possibilities include 'soft" hazards such as weather or noise-sensitive regions.
Next, the potential trajectories of the hazard relative to the aircraft are
calculated, each with its corresponding probability of occurring. The accuracy
to which these trajectories may be computed is a function of sensor accuracy
and the type of information available to the alerting system. An exclusion
zone is then calculated that defines the space in which the hazard must exist
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for an encounter to occur. An example situation is shown schematically in
Figure 3 for a TCAS application.
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ExclusionZone ...............:: , ,_ii._j{iiiiii!iii!!}/__v'_'T rajectory
_..,,.:_...:::!:i:!."..__. '.':_:_::_._.,'.I!I_F_:I::::_":"..... ._$:
•:_..,._.'.:_"',.:.:.:.:_.:::i:::::.'.:::::_..'.._:: '.-:._.:. :_"'...... :._.::}_
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Aircraft ....-...._ ....iThreat
ProbabilityDensityFunction
Figure 3: Exclusion Zone for Example TCAS Situation
The probability density function describing the hazard's location
(governed by sensor accuracies) is then integrated over the exclusion zone to
obtain an estimate of Pr(E) for that trajectory. The overall probability of an
encounter, given all possible trajectories, is then given by:
Pr(E) = _Pr(E I trajectory i) Pr(trajectory i)
all trajectories
These probabilities then lead to a better understanding of the potential for
nuisance alerts and may be used to estimate an overall level of safety for the
system.
This method has been applied and demonstrated using an existing
TCAS II system in which the aircraft is on a collision course with intruding
aircraft at various relative speeds. Figure 4 shows an example of the data
obtained from numerical integration using measurement errors typical of a
TCAS II system. Curves representing the estimated probability of collision
with a threat aircraft are shown as a function of range to the threat. The
upper curve represents the case where no avoidance action is taken, while the
lower curve represents a case in which a standard TCAS avoidance maneuver
is assumed: 5 second delay followed by a 0.25g pull-up until 1500 feet per
minute climb rate is attained [RTCA, 1983].
Also shown on the graph is the significance of the choice in alerting
threshold location. As shown, given a particular threshold there is a certain
probability that even with an avoidance maneuver there will be a collision.
In addition, there is a probability that the threat would have been avoided
even had no action been taken - the false alarm case. Between the two curves
is the effective benefit the alerting system would provide in terms of the
improvement in collision probability.
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0.1 _ Pr(FalseAlarm)
0.01 _ ------ No
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Figure 4: TCAS Example - Pr(E) Curves
Coaltitude threat on collision course, 400 kt
closure rate.
Top curve: no action taken
Bottom curve: 5 sec delay, 0.25 g pull-up.
2.3 Conclusions
The contributions of the framework for the evaluation of alerting
systems are as follows.
1) Major issues relating to alerting system effectiveness have been
identified and developed. A framework connecting these issues is then
formed that highlights the interactions that are possible between
system components.
2) A methodology has been developed that may be applied to complex
hazard encounter situations to estimate performance measures such as
nuisance alert rate or overall safety level.
3) The framework has been demonstrated through applications to actual
alerting system designs.
4) By using a generalized approach to alerting systems, the framework can
be applied to varied specific applications including civil and military
use, as well as to non-aviation related alerting systems.
A complete report of the research will be available as a doctoral thesis
in February, 1995.
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3. ANNOTATED REFERENCES OF 1993 - 94 PUBLICATIONS
3.1 Alhanatis, Robert; Analysis of Aircraft Surface Motion at Boston Logan
International Airport, FTL Report R94-5, September 1994, Flight
Transportation Laboratory, MIT, Cambridge, MA 02173
The purpose of this research is to examine the nature of aircraft surface
motion on the airport surface during normal operations. Twelve hours of
radar data, gathered by MIT Lincoln Laboratories from Logan Airport in
Boston, were made available for this study. Specifically, the data included
target position reports from the ASDE-3 surface surveillance radar and the
ASR-9 radar from the near terminal airspace information. This data covers a
variety of runway configurations, weather conditions, traffic levels and high
or low visibility conditions.
The study is divided into three sections. The first one focuses on the
runway, and examines occupancy times, exit velocities, exit usage and
velocity profiles of the final approach and landing phase. The second section,
analyzes fourteen runway-taxiway intersections. Results are presented for the
crossing times and usage of these intersections. The analysis also focuses on
relating crossing direction, runway configuration and aircraft size. Finally,
14
average taxiway velocities and the overall taxiway usage is measured.
Additionally, the role that the location of the taxiway segment, as well as its
length, plays in the variation of these velocities are examined. Where
possible, this study includes means, standard deviations and sample sizes of
the variables in question.
3.2 Achtmann, Eric - A State of the Art Review and Critical Analysis of
World Set Transport Safety and Aviation Fire Safety (to be published).
This research examines the safety in air transportation by jet aircraft
worldwide in the period 1970-1992 to find the relative occurrence of accidents
of different types. It then focuses on the risk of jet aircraft accidents involving
fire. Accident types are classified into 11 categories: Bird Strikes, Collisions
(Aircraft, Terrain), Weather Decompression, Ditching, Failed Takeoff, Fuel
Exhaustion, Ground (Stationary, Taxiway), In-flight explosion, Major
Mechanical Failure, Post Crash Fires, and Wake Vortex Upset. Types of
accidents are ranked by number of accidents, fatality tolls, and survivability
rates.
A case study review is given for the more interesting cases where fire
played a major role in a jet transport accident, and a brief review of past and
current Aircraft Fire Research activities is provided.
15

OHIO UNIVERSITY
_7
INVESTIGATION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY AT
OHIO UNIVERSITY
1993-1994
Robert W. Lilley
Avionics Engineering Center
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Ohio University
Athens, Ohio
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH
The Joint University Program (JUP) offers students, faculty, and staff of the
Avionics Engineering Center the opportunity to conduct basic research relating to the
safety and efficiency of the National Airspace System. During the 1993-1994 year
research was continued in a variety of GPS-related technologies and also in a hybrid data
uplink system.
• Processing techniques developed for the GPS attitude determination have been applied
to centimeter-level kinematic GPS aircraft positioning for flight reference systems and
aircraft autoland and taxing operations. This resulted in the first real-time kinematic GPS
autoland.
• The Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) algorithm developed under the Joint University
Program has been fully adopted by RTCA Special Committee 159 as the baseline
algorithm for sole-means navigation of GPS integrated with GLONASS, LORAN-C, or
baro-altimeter.
• A Satellite Coverage Research Analysis Model (SCRAM) has been developed which
provides outage areas, outage dynamics, and availability information for satellite-based
navigation systems. RTCA Special Committee 159 has adopted this model for use in
their work.
• A basic receiver structure has been simulated and tested for use with the hybrid data
uplink. This uplink utilizes the phase of an existing AM carrier to transmit digital data,
thus both amplitude and phase modulation are applied, resulting in a hybrid carrier. The
receiver simulation is directly applicable to real-time implementation as a result of the
development platform.
18
This research resulted in two M.S. theses, a Ph.D. dissertation, and various
conference papers. An annotated bibliography of these publications can be found on the
following pages. Also included is a bar graph which shows the various Ohio University
students and their current positions who research and resulting careers were made
possible through the funding provided over the twenty-three year history of the JUP
program.
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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF 1993-1994 PUBLICATIONS
1. Bemath, G. N.: Fault Detection and Exclusion in Multisensor Navigation Systems. M.S.
Thesis, Ohio University, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Athens, OH,
March 1994.
In order for a multisensor navigation system to meet integrity requirements, there
must be a way of detecting erroneous measurements, using only data from those
measurements. This can be accomplished using a parity space estimation algorithm.
Erroneous measurements must then be removed from the position solution; the entire
process is called Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE). A baseline FDE algorithm has been
determined and is capable of working in real time on present affordable hardware.
2. Diggle, D. W.: An Investigation into the Use of Satellite-Based Positioning Systems
for Flight Reference/Autoland Operations. Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio University,
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Athens, OH, March 1994.
An Interferometric Global Positioning System Flight Reference System (IGPS
FRS) is implemented and flight tested on a transport category aircraft. This dissertation
discusses the IGPS FRS theory and principles of operation, its architecture and
integration with the aircraft, and the initial static calibration and flight-test performance
results. The validity of the results is established by referencing them to a known ground
test point and/or laser tracking system. The principles underlying the operation of the
IGPS FRS are similar to those used for kinematic surveying, and are also referred to as
differential carrier-phase tracking with integer ambiguities resolved. Flight Reference
System objectives include: 0.1 m accuracy rms (each axis); one or more updates per
second; UTC (Universal Time, Coordinated) synchronization better than 0.1 ms; real-
time, all-weather operation; and, repeatable flight paths. The latter requirement call for
full integration with the aircraft flight control system and coupled flight.
3. Mathur, N. G.: Initial Characterization of QBIC IMU and Design of a DATAC Bus
Interface. M.S. Thesis, Ohio University, Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, Athens, OH, November 1993.
With the evaluation of digital computers and strapdown sensors in the 1960's,
inertial navigation technology has improved significantly. As compared to the bulky,
inaccurate and expensive gimbaled IMU's (Inertial Measurement Unit), development of low
cost, medium accuracy strapdown IMU's started with development in GPS (Global
Positioning System) technology, towards the later 1980. With good short term accuracy and
stability of IMU and good long term stability of GPS, the integration of IMU and GPS is
very beneficial. Theory of operation and initial characterization of Q-BIC IMU (Unit
2o
developed by Dr. M. Morrison) concluded that Q-BIC IMU has approximately 2 cm/sec 2
noise on the acceleration data at the rate of 8 samples/see. For flight evaluation of combined
Inertial and GPS position data, a DATAC (Digital Autonomous Terminal Access
Communication) bus interface is developed and successfully tested onboard TSRV
(Transport System Research Vehicle) Boeing 747-I00 by NASA Langley Research center
with GPS derived position data.
4. Skidmore, T. A.; van Graas, F.: GPS Integrity Monitoring and Multipath Error
Distributions. Proceeding of the ION 49th Annual Meeting, June 21-23, 1993.
The ability tOperform integrity monitoring of a differential Global Positioning
System (DGPS) precision approach system is dependent upon the form of the monitor
used and the various noise sources acting on the reference station, the monitor, and the
approaching aircraft This paper focuses on how much multipath and assumptions about
its probability density function (pdf) affect the availability of the integrity monitoring
function. Also discussed is a technique specified as Code/Carrier Integrity Monitoring
which can be used to greatly improve integrity monitoring availability over methods
employing convention C/A-Code operations.
5. Skidmore, T. A.; van Graas, F.: DGPS Ground Station Integrity. Proceeding of the
ION National Technical Meeting, January 24-26, 1994.
This paper summarizes the development of a unique Differential Global
Positioning System (DGPS) ground station integrity monitor which can offer improved
availability over conventional code-differential monitoring systems. This monitoring
technique, called Code/Carrier Integrity Monitoring (CCIM), uses the highly stable
integrated Doppler measurement to smooth the relatively noisy code-phase
measurements. The pseudorange correction is therefore comprised of the integrated
Doppler measurement plus the CCIM offset. The design and operational results of a
DGPS ground station integrity monitor are reported. A robust integrity monitor is
realized which is optimized for applications such as the Special Category I (SCAT-I)
defined in the RTCA Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards.
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FAULT DETECTION AND EXCLUSION
IN MULTISENSOR NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Gregory N. Bernath
Ohio University
Athens, Ohio
SUlVlMARY
In order for a multisensor navigation system to meet integrity requirements, there
must be a way of detecting erroneous measurements, using only data from those
measurements. This can be accomplished using a parity space estimation algorithm.
Erroneous measurements must then be removed from the position solution; the entire process
is called Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE). A baseline FDE algorithm has been
determined [i], and is capable of working in real time on present affordable hardware.
INTRODUCTION
Implementation of the satellite based Global Positioning System (GPS) provides the
opportunity to greatly improve the safety and efficiency of air transportation. Although GPS
in itself does not provide a sufficient level of availability, GPS augmented with the
terrestrial Long Range Navigation System (Loran-C) or the Russian Federation's Global
Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) has the potential to satisfy the Required Navigation
Performance (RNP) for all phases of flight except precision approach and landing.
Integrity refers to the ability of a navigation system to always perform within certain
performance bounds, or to provide timely warning to the pilot if the system is not within
these bounds. GPS presents a difficult problem in integrity checking, because there is
currently no external integrity monitor for GPS which can provide timely warnings. Thus,
any integrity checking performed by a GPS receiver must use only the existing GPS signals.
This process in general is referred to as Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI), while the
modified method described in this paper has been named Fault Detection and Exclusion.
Step errors or fast growing ramp errors can be detected with a recursive estimator
such as a Kalman filter, which does not require redundant measurements. However, this will
not detect slowly growing errors, such as a drifting clock. To detect such errors, a parity
space algorithm can be used, which requires redundant measurements, the more the better.
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FAULT DETECTION ALGORITHM
Estimation Space and Parity Space
Estimation space contains the real world measurements, and is where the navigation
solution is obtained. Due to noise and biases, there is always some position error in the
navigation solution. Since exact position is not known, position error is not known. Fault
detection is done in parity space, which is a mathematical tool where noise and biases are
used to create a parity vector. The parity vector is used to create a detection statistic dR,
which is compared to the detection threshold TD tO determine if an alarm condition exists.
Generally, a growing error in estimation space results in a growing detection statistic
in parity space. This relationship will depend on the satellite geometries at that time. With
a good geometry, a small position error with give a large (easily seen) detection statistic.
The reverse can also be true.
Figure 1 illustrates the case of two different slowly growing ramp errors plotted in
parity space vs. estimation space. Two of the parameters of interest are the detection
threshold TD, which is the alarm limit in parity space, and the alarm threshold T^, which is
defined as the allowable horizontal radial position error in the calculated user position. In
case I, the detection threshold is crossed before the alarm threshold, resulting in a false
alarm. As the error continues to grow, the alarm threshold is crossed, turning it into a true
alarm. In case II, the alarm threshold is crossed before the detection threshold, resulting in a
missed detection. As the error continues to grow, the detection threshold is crossed, turning
it into a correct fault detection.
False Alarms and Missed Detections
A fundamental problem of fault detection is that all measurements contain noise;
therefore fault detection always involves a degree of uncertainty. It is never possible to
know for certain that an error exists; it is only possible to "guess" within a certain
probability by examining a snapshot of parity space. The status of the algorithm is either
normal operation, correct fault detection, false alarm or missed detection. The two
undesirable events are a false alarm and a missed detection; therefore, probabilities of a false
alarm (PFA)and missed detection (P_) must be minimized. Traditionally, there has been a
trade-off between false alarms and missed detections -- reducing one increases the other.
However, having a high value for either one is unacceptable. Numerous false alarms reduce
user confidence in the system, and missed detections can result in unacceptable and
dangerous position errors. Therefore, instead of a trade-off between false alarms and missed
detections, both probabilities will be traded off against the protection radius, which is the
smallest horizontal position error that is guaranteed to be detected with the given probabilities
of false alarms and missed detections. Instead of setting an alarm threshold and then
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calculating the corresponding probabilities, first the probabilities are set and then the alarm
threshold and protection radius are determined from the probabilities. This guarantees the
accuracy of the navigation solution for all time and space points, and allows for changes in
the accuracy requirements without the need to make major changes in the algorithm.
The Detection Statistic
A fault is declared if the detection statistic dk exceeds the detection threshold TD. The
setting of the detection threshold depends on the measurement noise, the desired false alarm
rate, and the number of redundant measurements. Consider the case of oneredundant
measurement, where the parity vector (p_)is reduced to a scalar and dk = Ipl. In the
case where no measurement bias exists, figure 2 illustrates the probability density function
(pdf) of p when no measurement bias exists in any measurement, and measurement noise is
normally distributed. The mean is zero because the pdf has not been shifted by any biases.
Since no measurements are in error, the system is either in a state of normal operation or
false alarm. The probability of a false alarm (PF^) is obtained by integrating the areas
outside TD, which will be a standard Gaussian probability density function.
Figure 3 illustrates the case where a measurement bias does exist, causing real
position error. This real position error "translates" into a parity scalar with a nonzero mean
(The mathematics of this process are explained in the next section). On figure 3, the mean
of this parity scalar is at 100 "parity meters". If the real position error is above the alarm
threshold, the system is either in a state of correct fault detection or missed detection,
depending on how the measurement noise affects the parity scalar. The probability of a
missed detection (P_m) is the integral of the area within TD, which is again a Gaussian
function.
These diagrams may give the impression that PFAand P_ca_are determined by TD and
a, when actually the reverse is true -- TD is determined by PFAand o', and P_ determines
another threshold, the protection radius. It is helpful to look at this on an estimation
space/parity space plot. Figure 4 shows an ideal, no-noise case. The satellite geometries are
known, so the slope of the bias path is known exactly. The detection threshold and alarm
threshold can be adjusted to any position, so long as their intersection is crossed by the bias
path. This results in a system with no chance of false alarms or missed detections.
Starting with figure 5, noise is added to the system, represented by the "noise ball".
The bias is zero in this case, so the noise ball sits near the origin. The mean of the
distribution is not at the origin, since total position error and thus the detection statistic must
always be positive. The detection threshold is set far enough to the right so that the right
hand edge of the distribution does not overlap into "false alarm" enough to exceed the given
probability of false alarm. The corresponding alarm threshold has not been determined yet.
Determining T^ is a major part of the algorithm, and will be fully covered later.
One goal of the system is to find how large the detection statistic must be before a
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fault can be guaranteed to be identified with only a given small probability of missed
detections. This value is called/zM, the minimum detectable bias. In figure 6,/z Mis set too
low, resulting in an unacceptably large P_. In figure 7,/zM is set correctly, as almost none
of the distribution overlaps into "missed detection". Once TDand #Mare known, these are
used along with measurement noise and satellite geometry to determine what TA should be.
The following section presents the fault detection algorithm in detail.
Baseline Fault Detection Algorithm
The linearized relation between changes in the measurements and the corresponding
change in the user state vector is given by
_._= H 8__x (1)
where: &_ = measurement vector (m x 1)
It = data matrix (m x n)
_.__.x= user state vector (n × 1)
_._is a column vector of m elements containing the changes in measurements from m
sources. If only GPS satellites were used, it would consist of the pseudorange to each
satellite. _..__xis an n-element column vector of the change in user states, consisting of user
position coordinates and other navigation state elements such as clock offset with respect to
GPS time. I-I is an m × n matrix which relates the measurements to the user states.
Given the formulation in (1), three possible cases can occur:
1) m < n • Underdetermined system
2) m = n : Exactly determined system (provided H has full rank)
3) m > n ' Overdetermined system
In the underdetermined case, a navigation solution is not possible. In the exactly determined
ease, a navigation solution is possible, but fault detection is not. Algorithms for managing
the redundant measurements in overdetermined systems form the basis of fault detection.
The data matrix I-I can be decomposed into the product of a real m × m orthonormal
matrix Q (QrQ = I) and an m × n upper triangular matrix R using a "QR" factorization
[21,
H = QR (2)
R contains (m-n) rows of zeros along the bottom, due to the (m-n) redundant measurements
in It. Substituting (2) into (1) and pre-multiplying both sides by QT yields
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= QR_x
Q 'r_y = Q TQR_x (3)
R8___x= Q T_._
Now partition R into an n × n upper triangular matrix U and (m-n) rows of zeros, denoted
by 0. Similarly, partition Qnr into Qx (n x m) and Qp ((m-n) x m).
- - : = ! (4)
t<$Xn) t6.V,,)
Relating the change in measurements to the change in the user state vector, the least squares
navigation state solution is
U 5x = Qx-5-Y[ or 5._xx=U -_ QxS-_ (5)
and the parity equation is
0 = Qp 5_ (6)
Each column of Qp defines a measurement axis in parity space, and an error in measurement
i will lie along the ith measurement axis in parity space.
For measurements corrupted by errors, _._ is replaced by __ + _e+ h, where _eis an
m X 1 vector representing zero-mean, normally distributed measurement noise, and b_b_is an
m x 1 vector containing bias errors. If _._ in equation (6) is replaced by _ + _.e+ b__,the
zero can be replaced with the parity vector 1_,giving
p = Qp_)_y+ Qp_e+ Qpb (7)
p = Qp_e+ Qpb
1_is a function of measurement noise and bias errors. Therefore, it can be used as a
detection function for declaring faults.
/
One Redundant Measurement
If only one redundant measurement is available (that is, m = n + 1), parity space is
one-dimensional and Qp is reduced to a row vector ft. The parity vector 12is reduced to a
parity scalar p. In the absence of bias errors, p will have a zero-mean normal probability
density function given by
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1 (8)
fp(x)= o--_e
If the failure detection is based on exceeding a detection threshold TD, then the probability of
an alarm (P_ is
_/_L/_
PA = P (IPI>TD) - 2 fe _av_!dx (9)
avr_r" TD
which can also be written as
PA = erfc( TD / (10)
where erfc is the complementary error function,
eric(z) - 2_/'e_;_2d_, (11)
See figure 2 for a pictorial representation of equation (11). Note that if there is no
measurement bias, any alarm is necessarily a false alarm, and PA = PFA"
In the presence of a bias error in instrument i (or more than one instrument), the
parity scalar has a normal distribution with a mean of
= Iq'bl (12)
If instrument i has a bias, then only the ith elements of _t and b will contribute to the mean.
The probability density function of p is then given by
_/x-_/2
1 e _,a_/ (13)
fp(X) - ,_¢"_
Given a detection threshold TD, the probability of a missed detection is
TD _[x-/Ji/2
e _ (_v"Z/ dx (14)PMD= P (IPI-<TD)- ' f
O'v/_: _TD
see figure 3 for a pictorial representation of this equation. This can also be written as
3O
Since the integral from --_, to -T D is negligible for sufficiently large #_, the second term in
equation (15) can be ignored, leaving
1 effc(M-'rD/ (16)PMD= "_ \ oV"2/
Equations (10) and (16) define the performance of the fault detection algorithm in
terms of probability of f_se alarm (PFA)and probability of missed detection (PMD)as a
function of:
1. Detection threshold (TD)
2. Measurement noise standard deviation (a)
3. The expected value #i of the absolute value of the parity scalar p
which resulted from measurement bias in instrument i.
A given PF^, P_ and _rcan be used to obtain suitable TDand/xM (the minimum
expected value of the parity scalar required for detection). The detection threshold is
obtained using PFAand equation (10)
TD = O'v/_erfc-1 (PFA) (17)
Next, using this value of TD, plus PraD,equation (16) gives
//M = TD + °'t'c_ erfo-1 (2PMD) (18)
Equation (18) implies that PMDis satisfied only if the bias error gives rise to a/z_ such that/zi
= I_1_-I >- /zM. The vector _t is known from measurement geometry; therefore, for each
measurement i (i = 1 through m), the minimum bias error bi required to satisfy the
probability of a missed detection is calculated from equation (12).
/.tM
bi- Iql (19)
So given PF^, PMDand a, it foUows that the minimum detectable bias error is a function of
the measurement geometry. The minimum detectable bias error can then be used to calculate
the protection radius, the smallest horizontal position error which is guaranteed to be
detected within the given probabilities of false alarms and missed detections. This solves the
problem of choosing the estimation space alarm threshold T^.
Two or More Redundant Measurements
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If two or more redundant measurements are available, the parity vector will have two
or more elements, and will be a vector instead of a scalar. Each element of the parity vector
has a normal probability density function as given (for the without bias case) by equation (8).
Recall that each column of Qp defines a measurement axis in parity space, and an error in
measurement i will lie along the ith measurement axis. The number of axes will equal the
number of measurements, and the axes will lie in a parity space of (m-n) dimension (that is,
dimension = number of redundant measurements).
To maximize the visibility of a bias error, the parity vector is projected on to each of
the measurement axes. The norm of the projection is
I-mi' l
r i - (20)Iml
where mi is the ith column of Qp. Each ri given by equation (20) has a Gaussian
distribution, since the above operation is equivalent to a rotation in parity space. Instead of
one detection statistic, m detection statistics are obtained. Although m tests are performed,
these tests are not independent and have only (m - n) degrees of freedom. Therefore, the
detection threshold is given by
PFA= (m-n) x erfc/"ID / (21)
ta)
TD= (Ty_erfc-' (PFA ] (22)km-n}
In a manner similar to equation (19), the minimum bias error required to satisfy the
probability of missed detection for instrument i is
jLIM (23)
b_- Im__,l
FAULT EXCLUSION ALGORITHM
The ultimate objective of Fault Detection and Isolation is to ensure that the aircraft is
flying with a good position estimate. It is not necessary to isolate a bad measurement; it is
only required that the bad measurement is not used in the navigation solution. With this in
mind, Fault Detection and Exclusion was devised.
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In FDE, once an alarm is raised, the algorithm discards the present combination of
satellites and looks for the combination with the next best protection radius. If this set also
raises an alarm, the algorithm goes on to the next best set, and so on. Once a set is found
that doesn't raise an alarm, that set will be used for navigation. In this manner, the bad
measurement is not necessarily isolated, but it is excluded from the navigation solution if it
raises an alarm.
HARDWARE RESTRICTIONS
The fault detection algorithm works best when it uses all available satellite signals.
Adding more measurements will always improve performance, though sometimes only
slightly. Therefore, it should not be a minimum requirement to insist that the receiver tracks
all available satellites. In addition, most GPS receivers are not capable of tracking all visible
satellites. In order to reduce cost, many GPS receivers are limited to six channels, and can
track only six satellites. In order for the algorithm to be useful in practice, it must be
functional under this condition.
The solution is to use a "best-of-six" algorithm. This method generates all possible
subsets of six satellites from the set of satellites in view, and calculates a protection radius
for all of them. The set of six with the smallest protection radius becomes the one the
receiver uses to navigate. This may seem computationally prohibitive; however, the
calculation of all protection radii only needs to be redone when there is a significant change
in the satellite geometry. Recalculating once every five to ten minutes should be sufficient.
Figure 8 shows the protection radius at one different locations over a span of one day
using both the best-of-six method and using all satellites in view (based on a 24 satellite
constellation). The parameters used were tr = 32m, P_at, = lxl0-S, and PF^ - 6. 67x10"5.
As a reference, with these parameters, non-precision approach requirements would be
satisfied by a protection radius of 555m or less [3]. As expected, the all-in-view method is
the best, but only slightly more so than the best-of-six. If a receiver can use more than six
satellites, it should; otherwise, the best-of-six method would be sufficient.
MEASUREMENT WEIGHTING
Up until now, it has been assumed that all measurements have the same statistics. If
this is not the case, the fault detection algorithm can be modified to take differing statistics
into account. To accommodate different measurement variances, equation (1) is left
multiplied by a weighting matrix W
W_ : WHSx (24)
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The QR factorization is now done on WH, and equation (3) is replaced by
R_x = Q TW.(_.y (25)
This leads to a parity equation of
0 = QpW6_,y_ (26)
and a parity vector defined as
1_= QpW_e+ QpWb (27)
In general, W can be derived from the measurement noise covadance matrix, but in
most applications it is sufficient to simply use a diagonal matrix, where the diagonal elements
are the inverse of the measurement noise standard deviation. If W is correctly chosen, then
the elements of W_X have unit standard deviation.
One practical way of using measurement weighting is to include the baro-altimeter.
Since all aircraft have one, this effectively adds another measurement to the algorithm.
Since the noise and biases of the baro-altimeter change during different phases of flight, this
has to be taken in to account by changing the W matrix. Figure 9 shows a comparison of
protection radius for the best-of-six method alone, and the best-of-six method with altimeter
aiding. As expected, using the altimeter improves the protection radius significantly.
CONCLUSIONS
The fault detection algorithm has been fully characterized and verified. Any
assumptions made have erred towards being overly conservative. To guarantee the integrity
of the navigation solution at all times and locations, the probability of a false alarm should
not be traded off against the probability of missed detection. Instead, both should be traded
off against the protection radius.
The fault detection algorithm is most effective when measurements from all satellites
in view are utilized. However, many receivers can only use six satellites. For these cases, a
best-of-six algorithm has been developed which performs almost as well, and is thus an
acceptable solution.
A measurement from the baro-altimeter can be added by way of a weighting matrix,
and will improve performance considerably. Whenever possible, this measurement should be
included.
An erroneous measurement which raises the alarm need not be isolated (Fault
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Detection and Isolation). Instead, it can be excluded (Fault Detection and Exclusion). As
long as the bad measurement is not included in the navigation solution, it isn't necessary to
isolate it.
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Figure 2. Probability Density Function for p - no measurement bias
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HYBRID SYSTEM
GMSK DIGITAL RECEIVER IMPLEMENTATION
IN
REAL TIME
Sanjiv Koshal
Ohio University
Athens, Ohio
SUMMARY
This paper is concerned with the design, simulation and implementation of a hybrid
system using the GMSK type of signal format for phase modulation and demodulation. The
performance of the designed transceiver structure is evaluated using the Bit Error Rate (BER)
curves. The simulated system was also successfully implemented in real time.
INTRODUCTION
The transmission of real time weather data to the cockpit will greatly help in avoiding
major accidents that have been taking place practically from the beginning of aviation
history. These accidents caused by the unavailability of real time weather data to the pilot,
are second rated only to pilot error as reported by the latest statistics given by the National
Transportation Safety Board [1].
As airways become more and more crowded worldwide, improved weather
information is a solution to maintaining flight safety and lowering operational costs. A group
of organizations has come together to resolve this problem and have put forward several
methods of displaying real time weather data both for civilian and military users [2]. They
are proposing to use satellites, weather estimation software, cockpit avionics, etc. to
accomplish this task. These organizations include: Advanced Satellite Telecommunications,
Inc., Conwal, Inc., Garcia Consulting, ARINC, Lockheed, FAA, and NASA. The proposed
system intends to use an onboard receiver that is simple and inexpensive. During landing,
takeoff, and congested traffic conditions in the air space, the Air Traffic Control (ATC) is
often unable to supply the pilot with the necessary weather data information that might be
needed when approaching bad weather to determine a go/no-go situation [3]. In addition,
this voice data information provided to the pilot is extremely limited therefore, and a better
system needs to be developed. An ideal uplink would not affect the existing system and
simultaneously provide the pilot with more comprehensive real time weather information.
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HYBRID SYSTEM: POSSIBLE SIGNAL STRUCTURES FOR PHASE MODULATION
A hybrid modulation is where both amplitude modulation and phase modulation are
applied to the same carder. The existing AM signal can be modulated and demodulated
using available equipment thus eliminating costly replacements. The additional phase
modulation, representing the weather data, can be accomplished by a modification to the
existing AM transmitter. In order to receive the signal, an additional demodulator would be
necessary. This demodulator would cost far less than comparable airborne weather radar
systems and would provide much more extensive information since the reflectivity patterns
are generated by powerful ground-based systems.
Previous studies have looked into the possibility of using a coherent MSK signal
structure for phase modulation and demodulation [4]. The proposed system resulted in a 2-4
dB loss in BER performance. MSK provides better results in terms of voice degradation
when used in the hybrid signal than QPSK and BPSK because less spectral energy is
removed from the phase modulation through the transmission process. This is due to the fact
that MSK has a much more compact power spectrum than that of QPSK and BPSK.
Although MSK was thought to be the modulation of choice for bandwidth
conservation, recently developed modulation techniques improve upon the properties of
MSK. A class of these modulation methods exist in which the envelope of the signal remains
constant, a requirement for the hybrid signal [5]. Recent developments include the
smoothing of the phase path of these modulation methods by incorporating memory into bit
transitions. Applying these techniques in a hybrid modulated signal will provide superior
performance, for both the amplitude and phase modulations.
A study done by Dennis Akos at the Ohio University Avionics Engineering Center
established that a new modulation scheme, termed as Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying
(GMSK), would cause less interference in voice communications, when used for the hybrid
system [6]. The GMSK type of implementation was proposed to be applied in fields of
digital mobile radio telephony. The European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications
Administration selected this type of modulation scheme for the Pan-European Cellular Radio
System [7].
The latest simulation trials performed concluded that a higher data rate can be
achieved provided the spectral efficiency of the phase modulation is greater. By using MSK
as the phase modulation at 2400 b/s, a mean square error (MSE) of approximately 7.5 e-4
was introduced into the AM signal. For GMSK with a transmission filter bandwidth BT of
0.25, an acceptable MSE for data rates of up to 3900 b/s was achieved. It is evident from
this study done by Dennis Akos that the use of GMSK for the phase modulation of the hybrid
system would improve performance.
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SIMULATION SET UP FOR BER EVALUATION OF PHASE
MODULATION/DEMODULATION
The overall hybrid system BER simulation was done at baseband using the setup
depicted in Figure 1. A sum of five tones, given by
5
f ( t ) =E aicos (2'lTfit) (1)
i=1
in which the coefficients a i and f i (in hertz) have the values indicated in Table 1 [4], is
used to simulate a voice signal.
Amplitude (volts) Frequencies (Hz)
2/9 468.75
al ]"1
1/3 937.85
a2 f2
2/9 1406.25
a3 f3
1/9 1875.00
a4 f4
1/9 2343.75
a5 ]5
Table 1: Values for a i and fi (in hertz) for equation (1)
The output of the voice generator is multiplied by the phase modulated signal
structure at baseband. GMSK is used for phase modulation. The binary data used to phase
modulate the signal was kept at a constant data rate of 2400 b/s. Since the simulation was
performed at baseband; a lowpass equivalent of the channel filters were used with the
following characteristics [4]:
(i) The transmitter filter was second order butterworth, with -3 dB bandwidth of 7.5
kHz.
(ii) The receiver filter was fourth order butterworth, with -3 dB bandwidth of 5 kHz.
The voice signal and the phase modulated signal are multiplied to form the overall
hybrid signal. Complex Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) is added to the transmitted
signal. The amplitude envelope on the received signal is removed using a hard limiter
followed by a 4th order butterworth filter having a -3dB bandwidth of 3 kHz. Two bit or
42
one bit non coherent detection schemes can be employed for the phase demodulation of the
hybrid signal [8]. The GMSK demodulator block utilizes two hit differential detection which
can also be replaced by one bit detection scheme. Both detection schemes were evaluated for
phase demodulation.
The probability of bit error for the simulated system is evaluated as follows:
Let
P, = Average power of the transmitted signal
P, = Average noise power injected into the system
o 2 = variance of the noise injected into the system
R = data rate of the transmitted digital signal
f, = sampling frequency at which the system is simulated
NO is a positive constant, representing the one-sided spectral noise density
Now
- t',. (2)R'
The noise power is given as (Couch, 1989)
P. --No x L (3)
For complex noise, the noise power is given by twice the variance of the noise
Pn = 2 X 0"2; (4)
and therefore combining equations (3) and (4), we get
2 Xo 2 =N O xf, (5)
Thus
No = (2 xo z) (6)fs
Combining (2) and (6)
Eb (P, X f,)
No - (2 x trz) (7)
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We can find P_ by adding a complex average power estimator at the point where
the signal is being transmitted in the simulated system. Also the sampling frequency and the
variance of the injected noise is calibrated for the simulation. Thus we can calculate the
required Eb/N o for our system.
The simulation setup was used to obtained the BER curves for both one bit and two
bit differential detection schemes for phase demodulation of the hybrid system. Equation 7
was used to calculate the required Eb/NO for the hybrid system. The resulting BER curve
for the case of infinite-bandwidth and constant envelope data modulation using GMSK and
that for hybrid system using GMSK is as shown in Figure 2. The computer simulations
show a loss of about 2-4 dB with respect to the case of infinite-bandwidth and constant
envelope data modulation using GMSK signal structure. This data is consistent with prior
work using coherent detection methods.
A variation of the 3 dB bandwidth product, Bt .T , of the transmitting Gaussian
falter, results in a corresponding change in the spectrum of the transmitted signal. Variation
of B t .T were employed for the hybrid system and the respective BER curves were plotted in
Figure 3. A value of 0.75 for B t ,the 3 dB bandwidth product of the transmitting Gaussian
f'flter, provides the best performance when compared with the other two values tested. This
is due to the fact that there is less intersymbol interference in the transmitted signal and also
an increase in the bandwidth of the transmitted signal.
A comparison of the BER curves for the hybrid system using a non coherent MSK
receiver and a differential GMSK receiver, with a Bt .T of 0.75, is as shown in Figure 4.
Although the non coherent MSK hybrid system does provide a slightly better performance
then the GMSK hybrid system, the use of the GMSK modulation/demodulation is preferred
due to restrictions imposed on us for the occupancy of the bandwidth by the transmitted
signal and resulting degradations in the AM signal.
In an ideal situation the two bit detection scheme provides better performance when
compared to the one bit detection scheme [8]. However, the simulation involves finite
bandwidth and amplitude modulation. The one bit detection scheme was also evaluated for
the hybrid system for phase demodulation and the BER curve is as plotted in Figure 5.
From the plot it is apparent that the two bit detection scheme does provide better
performance.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes the use of a GMSK type of signal structure for phase
modulation/demodulation in the hybrid system. The use of a GMSK type of non coherent
detection scheme has been discussed and has been proven to show an improvement in system
performance as compared to the use of MSK signal structure in terms of voice degradation.
The computer simulations for the phase modulation/demodulation of the digital data has
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derived the performance BER curve. The use of GMSK thus allows the transmission of the
hybrid signal in a much tighter bandlimited spectrum than MSK, which in turn introduces
less voice degradation at equal data rates. The use of such a receiver structure can be used
on a mobile platform, as Doppler shift has minimal effect on the receiver performance.
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GPS INTEGRITY MONITORING AND MULTIPATH ERROR DISTRIBUTIONS
Trent A. Skidmore
Frank van Graas
Avionics Engineering Center
Ohio University
BIOGRAPHY L INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
'As a Research Engineer and newly-appointed Adjunct
Assistant Professor at the Ohio University Avionics The components of a typical differential Global
Engineering Center, Dr. Trent A. Skidmore has been Positioning System (DGPS) instrument approach
involved in a variety of GPS-related projects. These system are illustrated in Figure 1. The reference
have included the development of a coverage model for station supplies the approaching aircraft with
studying availability, integrity, and reliability issues differential corrections in order to take advantage of its
associated with satellite-based navigation systems, a known location to remove errors common to both
GPS radio-frequency interference model, and spectntm itself and the aircraft. These errors include
issues associated with the DGPS ground-to-aircraft ionospheric and tropospheric delays and those errors
datalink. He also participates in the FAA/NASA Joint caused by Selective Availability. While the datalink is
University Program for Air Transportation Research shown as a VI-IF channel, other channels, such asand is the Co-Principal Investigator for the Aeronautical
Mode-S, have been used experimentally.Hazard Alerts Program sponsored by the FAA. He is a
graduate of Ohio University (Ph.D., 1991) and
Michigan Technological University (M.S., 1988 and The integrity monitor receives the differential
B.S. (with honc_'s), 1986), all in electrical engineering, corrections from the reference station and processes
them, along with local measurements, to compute a
Frank van Graas, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of location. If this location is outside a given alarm
Electrical and Computer Engineering, and a Research threshold the monitor alerts the reference station that
Engineer with the Avionics Engineering Center of Ohio its corrections are no longer valid. In general,
University. Since 1985 he has been involved with integrity can be defined as the quality which relates to
integrated navigation systems, Differential GPS, and the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the
FlightReferenceYAutoland Systems. information supplied by the total system. In this
scenario, integrity is the ability of the system to
provide a timely warning when the position error
ABSTRACT exceeds a specifp..d threshold. The hangar depicted in
Figure 1 is used to indicate that multipath is the
The ability to perform integrity monitoring of a dominant error source in any given DGPS operation.
differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) While it has generally been assumed, perhaps for
precision approach system is dependent upon the form mathematical convenience, that multipath errors
of monitor used and the various noise sources acting on exhibit Gaussian behavior, this premise has not been
the reference station, the monitor, and the approaching justified.
aircraft. This paper focuses on how multipath and
assumptions aboutits probability density function (pdf) Previous work by Creamer et. al. [1] established a
affect the availability of the integrity monitoring baseline integrity monitoring methodology for a
function. Also discussed is a technique specified as Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) precision
Code/Carrier Integrity Monitoring which can be used to approach application consistent with the Instrument
greatly improve integrity monitoring availability over Landing System (ILS) requirements. In order to
methods employing conventional C/A-Code operations, compute the availability of the integrity monitoring
function several key assumptions were used. These
are."
Presented at the Institute of Navigation 49th Annual Meeting,/une 21-23, 1993
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• Carriersmoothed C/A-Codetechniquesareused Satellite 14 datafrom two consecutive days were used.
• The dominanterrorsource is multipath The root-mean-square(RMS) of the errorfor the C/A-
• MtdtipathisGaussianlydistributed Code,P-Code,andNarrowCorrelator(NC)C/A-Code
• VerticalEn'or=VDOPxUERE receiversare shown. These RMS valuesare
• Multipathcorrelationtimeis200seconds subsequentlyusedfordistributioncomparisons.
Basedon theseassumptionsandotherspecifiedin
Reference[I],itwasfoundthatsatisfactorylevelsof TableofRMS Errors
integritycouldonlybe achievedwithan average
vertical dilution of precision (VDOP) of less than 1.5, PIDc_S Day 1 Day2
yielding an integrity monitoring availability of
approximately 0.6, equivalent to only 14.4 hours per C/A-Code 0.76 0.76
day. This large unavailability is in part directly linked
to the assumptions concerning multipath error P-Code 0.07 0.12
distributions and the relationship between vertical
position errorand VDOP. The next section highlighls NC C/A-Code 0.15 0.13
thecurrentresearchrelevanttotheseassumptions.
2. MULTIPATH ERROR DISTRIBUTIONS RMS Error (In)
In orderto study mnltipath error distributions it was
necessary to devise an experiment that would be For the comparison, the cumulative distribution
x_resentative of a typical DGPS approachinstallation, function (cdf) is used. The cdf is defined as the
For the test, data were collected simultanenusly at two integralof the probability density _ and is more
different sites at the Ohio Univenity Airport. The sites suitable for comparingrandomvariables than the pdf.
were located approximately two miles apart to This becomes apparent when the cumulative
minimize the probability of common maltipath. For distribution is plotted using probabilistic scaling.
each site, the antennaswere placed in a cleated field on Using probabilisficscaling, the cumulativedistribution
the ground. This was done to minimize multipath, function of a Ganssian distribution appears as a
While it could be argued that ground placement of straightline. Figures 3a - 3f compare the cunmlative
antennasisimpractical, previous resultsby Wald [2] distributionfunctions of the residual errors to their
have shown that careful antenna selection, even in
multipath-rich environments, can yield results corresponding Ganssian cdfs when the standard
consistent with ground-placed antennas. At each site, deviationof the Gaussiandistributionsareset equal to
two receivers (one employing a dual frequency theRMS of the residual em_fs.
architecatre,the other a nan_w-correlator design) were
connected to a common antenna. Two twelve-hour Notice in Figures 3a and 3b thatthe residual errors of
staticdatacollectionswereperformedoveraperiodof theC/A-CodereceiverappearGanssiantowithin
two days. The data werecollectedata rate of one approximately +_2_. Beyond +_cy the residoals' cdf
measurementper second, appearstnmcated. Note also the similarity between
Day 1 and Day 2. The cumulative distribution
The residual errors were obtained using the "code - functions for the P-Code and the NC C/A-Code
integratedDoppler"techniqueas outlined in [2] and by receivers areshown in Figures 3c - 3f. It is interesting
Braasch [3]. The residual errors contain mnltipath, to note that the errors here aremuch smaller than for
thermalnoise, and n_ziver enm% of which it has been
shown thatmuitipath is the dominant component. An the conventional C/A-Code receiverandthatthe mean
example plot of re$idunl errors is shown in Figure 2. of the l_tuah is no longer zero. This indicates that
The plot contains one hour of data(3,600 points) from for these architectures, the residual errc_ are non-
two consecutive days. The traces have been offset by symmetric and/or non-stationary. Thus, while the
+2 meters for Day 1 and by -2 meters for Day 2 for residualurvts for the conventionalC/A-Code n_ver
illustrative purposes. Note that while there is some can be approximated as a _ u-uncatedGau_ian
degree of correlation due to muitipath, the signals are distribution, the P-Code and the Narrow Correlator
predominantly noise-hT_ This is indicative of the C/A-Code do not appearstrictlyGaussian. While this
naturalmuitipathrejection mechani.qnprovided by the example is not intended tobe the definitive work on
gmnnd-placedantenna, residual en'r_ distributions, it does illustrate that the
Gaussian assumption is not completely valid and will
In order to illnstrate the distribution of the residual tend to overeslhnate the detrimental affect of
errors,and specifically the muitipath errors, and how muitipathat theDGPS referenceandmouil_ stations.
they compare with the simple Gausaian a._umption,
a_ier t_ f_ t_k. F,_thi_twohorn _'
5O
3. VERTICAL POSITION ERROR AND VDOP T is the time between measurementsin seconds
The usual approximationfor relating the RMS vertical The differential GPS correctionis now the difference
position error to the vertical dilution of precision between the estimated truerange and the calculated
(VDOP) is given as: true range based on the satellite position and the a
priorireference or monitor station coordina_. Note
VerticalPosition ErrorffiVDOPxUERE (I) that the estimated true range is corrected for the
knownsatellite clock offset fromGPS time, but it stillwhere UERE is the RMS user equivalent range error
froma given satellite, contains the effects of tropospheric and ionospher_
propagationdelays andSele_ive Availability.
A major factor affecting the validity of the above
assumptionis the elevation angle of the satellites used. The monitor station compares the differmce between
Itis recognizedthatelevation-dependenterrors,such as the differential correction as transmitted by the
multipath and tropospheric delay, decrease with reference station and the. differential correction as
increasingsatellite elevation engle. This phenomena is determined by the monitor station. If the absolute
illuswatedin Figuse 4 for troposphericdelays. In order value of this difference is larger than the preset
to determine the extent to which Equation 1 threshold,an alarmisraised.
overestimates the vertical position error, a simulation
was conducted. For this, the average VDOP at three
medium-latitude locations was found to be 1.6 Next, it is conservatively assumed that the code phase
(assuming the GPS 21 Primary Constellation and a rneasurementsare_yindependent andhavea
mask angle of 7.5°). It was found that the RMS normal(Gaussian)pmbability distribution. Integrated
trop_pherk: delay is appm_y 19A meters. Thus, carrier phase measurements error is assumed to be
if Equation I is used to compute vertical position error negligible (well below I cmRMS if integratedover 1
theresultwonidbe 31.0meres. The tree RMS vertical second). Note thatiftbe directsignal is smmger than
position-errorwas computed to be 11.3 meters. This the reflected/diffracted signal, then the carrierphase
indicates that Equation 1 overestimates the effect of multipath error is always less than or equal to one
VDOP on vertical position error by a factor of quarter wavelength (4.8 cm for the GPS L1
approximately2.6. While Equation 1 may indeed be frequency). Based on these assumptions, the
useful for some applications, it is an inappropriate estimated true range will have errors that are also
assumption for use in computing approach system
integritylevels, normallydistributedwith zero mean and a varianceof
_2/n, where n is the number of samples used to
3. CODE/CARRIER INTEGRITY MONITORING estimate the truerange. Furthermore,with probability
of missed detection (PMD) the estimated true range
The Code/Carrier Integrity Monitoring (CCIM) has an offset errorof less than :ix meters, where x is
technique uses the GPS carrier signal for the pfimazy given bydetectionof signal failuresthatwould cause the vertical
containment warning level (CWL) to be exceeded
(CWL = 8 mete_ for CAT I and 9.76 meters for the x =_ effc'l(PMD) (3)
SCAT-I [4]). Figure 5 illustrates the bask: concept of
CCIM. The GPS carder phase is integrated over time 1 !('e"toobtain an accuratem asure of the change in th range where: erfc = 7-2dZ
to the satellite. To find an accurate absolute range to _ )z
the satellite, the offset between the true range to the
satellite and the integrated carrier phase is estimated
using the code phase meas_. Next, this offset is Also, the probabilityof a false alarm(PFA) is equal to
added to the integrated carrier phase to obtain the theprobability of a missed detection ff the thresholds
estimated truerange. For example, the estimated true fordetectionareset at -x and x.
range (ETR) at time t could be calculated using the
previous n measttzementsof code phase and integrated The position error is relatedto the range errorstlmmgh
can'/erphase: thefollowing relation:
n-z -ARt7
Y (p(t-iT)-*(t-iT)) I N] : AR2]ETR(t) = 4_(0+ i = 0 (2) AE .1HTn =G 3I G= (HTH) (4)
where: p is the measemd code phase in metem ,Xt ! "
,is e=  erph in ffi .,
51
where H is a data matrix. Each row of H consists of the within _+0.6meters of the estimated statistic. Next,
partial derivatives of the range with respect to East Equation 5 provides the maximum possible vertical
position (E), North position (N), vertical position (u), position error. The effect of satellite geometry was
andclock Offset (t), respectively, simulated using three representative locations in the
U_., which resultedin the following relation:The maximumpossible verticalposition enrorbasedon
theoffset error,x, is calculatedfrom Au< 0.6 x 2.4 x VDOPAvG (meters) (6)
n
Auffix Y_ [g31_ (5) whereVDOPAvG is the average valee for the verfical
k = 1 dilution of precision. Equation 6 can be rewritten to
whereg3k is the kth elementof the thirdrow of G. obtainthe final result based on a maximum CWLof 8
metex$:
If the maximum vertical position error is greater than
the_ integrity monitoringcannotbe achieved with VDOPAv G < 5.6 (7)
the required probabilities of false alarm and missed
detection. This is an impommtresult. Although the derivation
for the VDOP requirement using the CCIM is very
In summary,the CCIMtechniqueproceedsas follows: conservative, the availabilityof CCIMis in fact higher
than the availability of positioning for CAT I
1) Estimate the truerange using the code phase and operations. Figure 6 is used to Fmd the predictedthe integratedcarrierphase(see Equation2);
availabilityof CCIM,which is greaterthan99.8% [see
2) Form the differentialcorrectionusing the estimated Reference5].
truerange and the calculated true range based on the
satelliteposition and theknownreference location; 3.1 ADDITIONAL CCIM CONSIDERATIONS
3) Similarly form the differential correction for the The availabilityof CCIM can be furtherincreasedby:.
monitorstation. Verify that the difference between the
corrections from the reference and the monitor station • Longer averaging: the 300-second interval should
arewithin the detectionthresholdsgiven by Equation 3. not be much longer in order to avoid the effect of
Calculatethe maximumpossible verticalposition eu_. code/carrier divergence due to the ionosphere.
4) Raise the alarmff thethresholdhas been exceeded, However, ff a dual-frequency receiver is used, this
or ff the CWL has beenexceeded, divergence effect can be measured and cozreetedfor;,
To illustrate the effectiveness of CCItvL a numerical • Cons/deringless thanthe wont case: it is ,mlikpJy
example follows. Assume that the code phase that the maximum possible error acts on all
measurement noise at the reference station and the measurementssimultaneously;
monitor station have a normal probabilitydistribution,
withzero mean and a standarddeviation of 1.2 meters. • Use different errors for each of the measurements,
This number is a conservativeestimate of the residual and calculate a weighted solution. Also consider the
C/A-Code error (see Figures 3a- 3b). Also, the errors propagationof these errors into the vertical positionbetween the reference and the monitor station are
assumed to be uncon_ated (Ixopersiting of the monitor em3r.
andthe referencestationshould assure this). The noise
level on the detection statistic is found by mot-sum- Before the carrierphase data is used, it is imperativeto
squaring the reference station noise and the monitor detect and repair any cycle slips that may have
occurred. For a static user, the detectionof cycle slips
station noise: _ 10.2 + 122 = 1.7 meters. Next, is relatively straightforward.For instance, the change
assume that the correlationtime of the samples is one
second, such that the probability of a missed detection in the integrated carrier phase for each satellitebetween two successive observations could be
should be on the orderof 10-9 on a per sample basis, examined. This change should be very smooth as a
(This value is more stringent than the ILS required function of time. A rapid change indicates a cycle
probability of missed detection of 10.7 per approach slip, while the change is pmpotlkmal to the numberof
a_d also satisfies the requiredalarm rate of less than cycles that were slipped or advanced by the receiver
10"3per hour). If a totalof 300 samples (5 minutes)axe trackingloop.
used for the averagingprocess, then using Equation 3
withprobability(t - tO'9),ez =,emonitorstatis is
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andwill be the focus of ongoing research:
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forDGPS referenceandmonitor stations.
• The analysis present in this paper is based on using
all-in-view receivers at the user, the monitor station,
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of satellites.
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data collection arerecommended for the Code/Carrier
IntegrityMonitoring.
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BIOGRAPHY 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Trent A. Skidmore, Ph.D. is a Research Scientist and With the release of RTCA DO-217 (Minimum Aviation
Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Ohio University System Performance Standards (MASPS) DGNSS
Avionics Engineering Center were he is involved in a Instrument Approach System: Special Category I
variety of GPS-related projects, including the (SCAT-I) [1], and the subsequent non-Federal systems
development of a coverage model for studying the that are under development throughout the industry,
availability and integrity of satellite-based navigation there remains an abundance of both technical and
systems and spectrum engineering issues associated with political issues which must be addressed. This paper
the DGPS ground-to-aircraft data link. He is a graduate focuses on one such technical issue: Ground Reference
of Ohio University (Ph.D., 1991) and Michigan Station Integrity Monitoring. Discussed are the
Technological University (M.S., 1988 and B.S. (with parameters relevant to integrity monitoring and basic
honors), 1986), all in electrical engineering, monitoring strategies, with emphasis on the SCAT-I
system. With the exception of the paper concerning the
Frank van Graas, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Dallas/Fort Worda Trials [2], an overview of the current
Electrical and Computer Engineering, and Principal literature shows a lack of relevant information
Investigator with the Avionics Engineering Center of concerning ground station integrity monitoring for
Ohio University. Since 1985 he has been involved with SCAT-I systems. However, previous work by the
integrated navigation systems, Differential GPS, and authors [3] demonstrated conceptually that a high
Flight Reference/Autoland Systems. availability integrity monitor is realizable using a
technique designated as Code/Carrier Integrity
Monitoring (CCIM). A detailed explanation and sample
ABSTRACT test results of CCIM will be given in Section 4.
This paper summarizes the development of a unique In order to conceptualize a typical Differential Global
Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) ground Navigation Satellite System (DGNSS), of which the
station integrity monitor which can offer improved NAVSTARGlobal Positioning System (GPS)is the key
availability over conventional code-differential space-segment component, consider the precision-
monitoring systems. This monitoring technique, called approach system depicted in Figure 1. The reference
Code/Carrier Integrity Monitoring (CCIM), uses the station supplies the approaching aircraft, via data link,
highly stable integrated Doppler measurement to smooth with differential corrections. The aircraft uses these
the relatively noisy code-phase measurements. The corrections to remove errors common to both itself and
pseudorange correction is therefore comprised of the the reference station. These errors include ionospheric
integrated Doppler measurement plus the CCIM offset, and tropospheric delays, satellite clock and ephemeris
The design and operational results of a DGPS ground errors, and those errors caused by Selective Availability.
station integrity monitor are reported. A robust integrity While the data link is shown as a VHF channel, a Mode-
monitor is realized which is optimized for applications S data link is also defined in the MASPS.
such as the Special Category I (SCAT-I) defined in the
RTCA Minimum Aviation System Performance The integrity monitor receives the differential
Standards. corrections from the reference station and processes
Presented at the Institute of Navigation 1994 National Technical Meeting, January 24-26, 1994
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them, along with local measurements, in order to Specifically, the following must be implemented:
determine the validity of the uplinked corrections. If the
monitor determines that some portion of the differential • The ground-based DGNSS Signal integrity
corrections are out of tolerance (beyond a given alarm Monitoring Function will be required to assess the
threshold), it must alert the reference station that its quality of the DGNSS signal prior to and during its
corrections are not valid, thus forcing the reference broadcast and provide an appropriate alert should that
station to discontinue operation. In general, integrity can signal not meet its performance specifications.
be defined as the quality which relates to the trust that
can be placed in the correctness of the information • The ground-based integrity monitoring function shall
supplied by the total system [4]. In this scenario, be used to validate the accuracy of the data generated by
integrity is the ability of the system to provide a timely the ground reference station and transmitted to airborne
warning when the position error exceeds a specified users. It shall be possible to demonstrate that the
threshold. The hangar depicted in Figure 1 is used to integrity monitoring function is functionally separate
indicate that multipath is the dominant error source in from the ground reference station function. The ground
any given DGPS operation, reference station and ground integrity monitor shall
employ independent antennae, or otherwise address '
multipath errors. The monitoring function shall validate
2. GROUND STATION INTEGRITY data prepared for transmission. This validation shall be
performed prior to RF transmission. The ground
The SCAT-I MASPS allocates the integrity requirements integrity monitoring function shall validate continued
to the ground, air, and data link segments (see MASPS acceptable performance of the SCAT-I data link.
Appendix D, Figure D-l). Specifically, the SCAT-I
system must be designed such that the probability of • The system latency of an integrity warning shall not
undetected violation of the outer tunnel containment exceed 6 seconds.
surface, constructed around the flight path defined by the
waypoints known to the airborne subsystem, is no greater • The total latency between the time of occurrence of a
than 10-7 per approach. This results in a probability of failure in the ground equipment and the time the last bit
of the integrity alarm is transmitted by the data link shall
an undetected failure in the ground segment of 3 x 10-8 be less than 3 seconds.
per approach. Although this allows for the design of the
ground station integrity function, it should be recognized • SCAT-I systems shall satisfy the ground station
that some of the data transmitted by the ground station is pseudorange allocation of 1.1 meters (defined as the
used by the airborne segment to achieve the airborne RMS value of the pseudorange correction errors).
integrity of 6 x 10-8 per approach. It should also be
pointed out that waypoint integrity is not addressed in the The monitor station must verify and validate all
MASPS. parameter values generated by the reference station.
These parameters are summarized in Table 1 for the
To achieve ground station integrity, the SCAT-I MASPS required Type-1 Message (see MASPS Appendix A). In
calls for (at least) the following key monitor features to this paper we are mainly concerned with the
be implemented (Note: The following statements are pseudorange correction (PRC), the range-rate correction
taken almost directly from the MASPS and are included (RRC), and the user differential range error (UDRE).
to help consolidate the relevant information). Two levels of accuracy must be monitored: the 95%
level (inner tunnel) and the 10-7 level (outer tunnel). It
1) Independent determination and verification of all data is recognized that the 95% level of accuracy can be
to be transmitted for compliance with the SCAT-I system
integrity requirements, based on an average, while the 10-7 level must be set for
each approach. Since the ground subsystem does not
have specific knowledge of how the ground data is used2) Independent detection and monitoring of all DGNSS
by the airborne equipment, it is important that allInstrument Approach System (DIAS) data transmissions
parameter values are accurate. For example, the ground
to assure correct transmission to aircraft in the DIAS subsystem does not know which satellites are used in the
precision approach phase of flight, airborne position solution, or how the satellites are
weighted in the solution.
3) Generate the appropriate actions to ensure aircraft are
notified upon SCAT-I system integrity failure.
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Table 1. Type-1 Message for SCAT-I {from [I]} To obtain the pseudorange correction (PRC), the "true"
Parameter Range range between the reference station antenna and the
satellite is calculated using the satellite ephemeris data.
Modified Z-count 20 minutes Next, both the measured pseudorange (PR) and the
estimated reference receiver clock offset from GPS time
Acceleration Error Bound 0.015 m/s2 are subtracted from the "true" range:
Satellite 1I) I - 64 ^
PRC = Isc - r I- PR - Atr (2)
Pseudorange Correction +/- 655.34 m
Issue of Data where:
Range-Rate Correction +/- 4.094 m/s tc :calculated satellite coordinate vector
^
UDRE 12.4 m Atr :estimated reference receiver clock offset from
GPS time
(Note: See MASPS [1] for further details)
which can also be written as:
In addition to achieving accuracy and integrity, the
ground station must also meet continuity and availability PRC _+ Etropo+ _iono + _p + _revr +
requirements. The performance of the SCAT-I system in = - (EAtr+
these areas must also be optimized. Probability of loss- _In+ EAtsv+ ESA) (3)
of-continuity must be less than 10-4 per approach. This
requirement places a bound on the allowable alarm rate where:
of the integrity function. Availability should be greater
than 95%, which means that the availability of the EAtr :residual reference receiver clock offset after
integrity function should be at least as good as the
availability of the accuracy performance, subtracting the estimated ref. receiver clock offset
:residual satellite coordinate error (t e - s)
3. PSEUDORANGE CORRECTIONS
Omitted from equation 3 are the spatial and temporal
The GPS pseudorange (PR) observation equation is decorrelation errors, which will be addressed in the next
given by: section. Ideally, the PRC only contains those error
sources that are in common between the reference station
PR = Is - r I+ At r + _-opo + Eiono+ _mp and the airborne user. These are: the tropospheric delay
error, the ionospheric delay error, the difference between
+ Erevr+ _n + eAtsv+ _A (1) the true and calculated satellite clock offset, the line-of-
sight component of the difference between the true and
where: calculated satellite coordinates, and Selective
Availability errors. The remaining components in
s :true satellite coordinate vector equation 3 represent the error in the PRC. Any
r :true (surveyed) reference station antenna component that is common to the PRCs for all satellites,
coordinate vector such as the error in the reference receiver clock offset
Atr :reference receiver clock offset from GPS time estimation, propagates into an airborne clock error, but it
_a'opo :tropospheric propagation delay does not affect the airborne position solution. Note,however, that this type of error would greatly affect a
Eiono :ionospheric propagation delay differential user who uses less than four satellites.
_p :multipath errors Therefore, for this paper, it is assumed that the airborne
_rcvr :receiver measurement errors user navigates with corrections for at least four satellites
_n :thermal noise at all times.
EAtsv :residual satellite clock offset from GPS time Thus, the errors in the PRC are thermal measurement
after applying the broadcast clock correction noise, reference station multipath, and receiver
_SA :Selective Availability errors measurement errors, each of which are discussed below:
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Thermal measurement noise: the thermal noise power in quarter wavelength (4.8 cm) as long as the direct Signal
combination with the received GPS signal power is stronger that the reflected or diffracted signal.
determines the amount of noise on the code and carrier Although code phase multipath can be as large as 150
phase measurements [5]. Table 2 provides the RMS meters for a standard C/A-code receiver, typical
code and carrier tracking noise of a second-order measured values are on the order of 1-3 meters [6].
tracking loop for the minimum GPS signal strength of Code phase multipath is reduced by averaging against
-160 dBW (dB with respect to 1 Watt). the integrated carrier phase. Care must be taken
however that the period of integration is longer than the
Table 2. RMS Errors Due To Thermal Noise {from [5] } period of the code phase multipath error. Otherwise, a
Code Tracking Loop Carrier Tracking Loop bias error will be introduced into the differential
corrections. Ground station multipath is reduced by
(2nd-order) (2nd-order) proper antenna design and ground station antenna siting.
4-Hz 0.5-Hz 0.5-Hz 16-Hz
.Receiver measurement error: Measurement errors for
Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth current digital GPS receivers are small compared to
errors introduced by thermal noise. The main error
4.2 meters 1.5 meters 0.2 mm 1.2 mm sources are receiver measurement resolution, dynamic
tracking loop errors, and interchannel biases. Dynamic
From Table 2 it can be seen that the code tracking loop tracking loop errors are generally small for a stationary
noise can be reduced by reducing the tracking loop user. Digital receivers usually have very good
bandwidth. For a stationary user it is generally not a measurement resolution (better than 0.1 m); however,
problem to reduce the code tracking loop bandwidth to older analog receiver architectures could have
below one Hertz. It should be noted however that the measurement resolutions on the order of one or two
effective data rate is also reduced. If one independent meters. Interchannel bias errors can be significant
update per second is required, then the tracking loop (greater than 0.1 m) for receivers that employ separate
bandwidth should not be reduced to much lower than 0.5 hardware channels for each satellite being tracked.
Hz. Receiver measurement errors are easily identifiable by
using a GPS signal generator or by performing a zero-
The carrier tracking loop noise is small compared to the baseline test against a good receiver (this is a test where
code noise. If the code tracking loop is carrier-aided, two receivers are connected to the same antenna).
then the code tracking loop bandwidth could be set
smaller than 0.5 Hz, as long as the independent updates Spatial and Temporal Decorrelation_ Errors: The
are based on the carrier phase measurements. In that accuracy of the PRC will degrade as a function of both
case, care must be taken to ensure that no cycle slips time (temporal decorrelation) and distance (spatial
occur which would bias the code phase measurements, decorrelation). Temporal decorrelation must always be
Also, the time period of the aiding process should not be considered because it is independent of the location of
longer than 1 to 2 minutes to avoid code-carrier the user relative to the reference station. This also
divergence due to the ionosphere. The latter problem means that temporal decorrelation errors can be fully
could be alleviated by making dual frequency observed by a monitor station. In contrast, spatial
measurements or through accurate modeling of the decorrelation errors cannot be fully observed by one
ionosphere. Most carrier-aided code tracking loops monitor station, especially if the monitor station antenna
provide rms tracking noise on the order of 0.3 meters or is close to the reference station antenna. Spatial
better [6]. decorrelation is not an issue if the reference station is
close to the airport runway (within a few kilometers).
Multipath: Multipath error consists of two components: However, larger separation distances (30 to 100 miles)
diffuse and specular. Diffuse multipath contains high between the reference station and the user could
frequencies (several Hertz) and originates from relatively potentially degrade the accuracy of the PRC beyond
small reflective or diffractive objects. Specular acceptable levels. Error sources that are susceptible to
muitipath has a low frequency with periods of up to spatial and temporal decorrelation are ionospheric and
several minutes. Specular multipath originates from tropospheric delays, satellite clock and ephemeris errors,
larger objects, such as the ground or a large building, and Selective Availability.
The effect of multipath on the code phase measurements
is much larger than on the carrier phase measurement. Temporal decorrelation errors are dominated by
Carrier phase multipath error is always less than a Selective Availability. Although these errors can be
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measured by the monitor station, it is necessary that the lower elevation satellites. These two principals can, in
rate of change of SA is slow enough such that the PRC general, be considered as averaging and differencing
and the RRC can correct for this error. If the nominal techniques. For averaging, the goal is to base the
age of the differential correction is 3 seconds, then the pseudorange corrections on the carrier errors rather than
maximum allowable unmodeled SA acceleration term the errors affecting the code. Consider Figure 2, which
should be less than 0.24 m/s 2 in order to maintain the 1.1 illustrates the true and measured parameters typically
m PRC accuracy. Note however, that this same available from a C/A code, standard positioning service
acceleration would cause a ranging error of 27 meters if (SPS) GPS receiver. Given the true integrated Doppler
the age of the correction is 15 seconds. If this occurs, measurement, IDtrue, the following can be defined:
then the Acceleration Error Bound in the correction
message would be set to indicate unacceptable IDmeas =IDtrue +errorcarr (4)
acceleration errors. PRtrue = IDtrue + A (5)
A= PRtrue(0) (6)Spatial decorrelation errors can be separated into
PRmeas = PRtrue + errorcode (7)propagation delays and satellite orbit errors. The main
problem is that these errors cannot be observed by a
nearby monitor station. Although ionospheric Using eq. 2, the pseudorange correction (PRC) can be
decorrelation errors of up to 0.5 m over a 9 km distance defined as the difference between the pseudorange
have been reported [7], these errors are generally small, calculated at the reference station and the estimated (or
Similarly, tropospheric delays usually do not decorrelate measured) PR:
very rapidly. Both ionospheric and tropospheric delays
require additional study to verify the validity of PRC=PRRef(calc)-PR (8)
differential corrections over longer distances. The main
concern would be the 95% accuracy performance of the 1-.
BasingPR on the the measured carrier plus the CCIMdifferentially corrected position solution.
offset A
Satellite orbit errors on the other hand can be significant.
The range decorrelation is approximately 1 percent of the A ^
satellite Crosstrack (XTK) or Alongtrack (ATK) error PR = IDmeas + A (9)
and less than 0.3 percent of the satellite radial (RAD)
error for a 100 nmi distance from the reference station. I-- ^
In the absence of SA, orbit errors are on the order of 3-6 PR = IDtrue + errorcarr + A (10)
meters for XTK and ATK errors, respectively and
approximately ! meter for RAD errors. This would yielding
result in PRC errors of less than 6 cm for a 100 nmi
^
distance. Unfortunately, XTK and ATK errors could be
PRC = PRRef(calc) - 0Dtrue + errOrcarr + A) (11)increased to 300 meters while maintaining the I00
meters (95%) positioning accuracy [8]. This would _.
result in PRC errors of 3 meters for a 100 nmi distance. Given that A and PRRef(calculated ) can be found, theThis level of error would exceed the 1.I meter level, and
in addition, the error cannot be observed by a local resulting pseudorange correction is given as
monitor station (Note: SCAT-I systems are to meet
PRC = - (errOrcarr+ _) (12)specifications out to a range of 20 nmi (minimum) from
the runway threshold for each supported approach).
where Eis the residual error.
4. CODE/CARRIER INTEGRITY MONITORING The CCIM offset can be estimated in real time using the
expression
Code!Carder Integrity Monitoring (CCIM) is based on
two fundamental principals: 1) averaging the code phase ^ ix-_N
measurements against the integrated Doppler frequency A = 2., PRmeas - IDmeas (13)
shift (carder) measurements to provide low-variance Nn=l
pseudorange corrections, and 2) using the highest ^
elevation satellite(s) to detect multipath errors on the where the initial value of the CCIM offset, A, is based
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on using an N-point initialization period over a time of the position solution for the aircraft. For instance, to
zero-mean multipath. Subsequent values of the CCIM accommodate for satellite-dependent UDREs, a UDRE
offset are based on a sliding, "fading-memory" window weighting matrix can be defined and applied in the
which is updated with each new sample, aircraft.
To illustrate how the windowing in CCIM addresses The other facet of the CCIM technique relies on the
rapid noise fluctuations (multipath) in the pseudorange relative elevation of the satellites to detect and isolate
measurements, consider the results shown in Figures 3. faulty satellite measurements. Consider a high (H) and
For these, data were collected at once per second using a low (L) elevation satellite pair at both the reference (Ref)
Novatel GPSCard TM with the antenna placed on the and monitor (Mort) stations. (The two satellite case is
hangar roof at the Ohio University Airport (UNI). The for illustrative purposes only, with the recognition that
plots on the left show the residual and satellite elevation all low elevation satellites would be tested against the
angle as a function of time for three representative highest satellite). The pseudorange corrections can be
satellites. The residual is defined as follows: differenced as follow:
Residual = Code - Carder - mean{Code - Carder} (14) PRCHRef- Mon ---PRCHRef- PRCHMon (15)
= 8B + error H
From the graphs it can be seen that high elevation
satellites exhibit, in general, only moderate errors, with and
the large fluctuations being due primarily to the
multipath associated with the rooftop antenna placement.
The graphs on the right in Figure 3 show the standard PRCLRef-Mon = PRCLRef-PRCLMon (16)
deviation of the CCIM offset (using a 300-point window) = 8B + error L
for the corresponding data. From these it can be seen
that the CCIM offset smoothes the residuals and forms a where it is noted that the residual clock bias (SB) is equal
metric for determining the overall error in the for both (all) satellites. Differencing the low elevation
pseudorange measurements. Note that the standard satellite against the high yields:
deviation (essentially the RMS error) in the CCIM offset
exceeds the alarm limit of 1.1 meters in several cases, PRCHRef-Mon -PRCLRef- Mon
illustrating the need for real-time monitoring of the =error L- error H. (17)
corrections. It is important to point out that CCIM can
also accounts for the ionospheric divergence inherent in
the single-frequency residual calculation. Assuming that error H << error L (_O_H + O2L=GL)
then it is clear that differencing shows the errors on the
low elevation satellite(s), thus providing a mechanism
5. UDRE AND CC1M DIFFERENCING for fault detection and isolation. It is assumed that prior
to this differencing a full set of computations will be
An additional consideration to SCAT-I integrity performed which calculates the position based on each
monitoring is the user differential range error (UDRE) set of four satellites. This will allow for a final integrity
parameter. The MASPS defines UDRE as an estimate of check on all the data.
the pseudorange correction accuracy as estimated by the
reference station. The confidence in this estimate should
be at least 99.5%. While the MASPS is clear in this 6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
definition, it leaves the determination and usage of
UDRE up to the system designers. While it is apparent It has been shown that Code/Carrier Integrity Monitoring
that UDRE can be based on satellite elevation angle and contains concepts useful in meeting the integrityheuristic anomalies such as known multipath, it is
important to point out that UDRE should also be based requirements of a precision approach system such as the
on real-time measurements. This is illustrated by again DGNSS SCAT-I realization. The paper has also
referring to Figure 3, where it can be seen that satellites highlighted the critical integrity monitoring design
at moderate elevations (20 ° - 50 °) are prone to parameters which must be addressed in the development
substantial error fluctuations. In the aircraft, the UDRE of any precision approach system. Future work will
is used to calculate the tunnel incident alarm. Another address quantifying the residual errors as a function of
significant application of the UDRE can be in weighting satellite elevation angle. Effort will also be focused
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towards the development of a full system to serve as a
test bed for various implementation strategies.
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INVESTIGATION OF
AIR TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY
AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, 1993-1994
Professor Robert F. Stengel
Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey 08544
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH
The Air Transportation Research Program at Princeton University pro-
ceeded along four avenues during the past year:
• Microburst Hazards to Aircraft
• Wind Rotor Hazards to Aircraft
• Flight Control System Robustness
• Intelligent Aircraft/Airspace Systems
This research has resulted in a number of publications, including theses,
archival papers, and conference papers. An annotated bibliography of publi-
cations that appeared between June 1993 and June 1994 appears at the end
of this report. The research that these papers describe was supported in
whole or in part by the Joint University Program, including work that was
completed prior to the reporting period.
Severe downdrafts and resulting high velocity outflows caused by
microbursts present a significant hazard to aircraft on takeoff and final
approach. Microbursts, which are often associated with thunderstorm activ-
ity, also can occur in the vicinity of dissipating convective clouds that pro-
duce no rainfall at ground level. Microburst encounter is a rare but ex-
tremely dangerous phenomenon that accounts for one or two air carrier
accidents and numerous general aviation accidents each year (on average).
Conditions are such that an aircraft's performance envelope may be inade-
quate for safe penetration unless optimal control strategies are applied.
An expert system for wind shear avoidance that extends the FAA
Microburst Windshear Guidelines to account for temporal and spatial varia-
tions in wind shear was developed in prior research. Measurements made by
a look-ahead sensor (e.g., Doppler radar or lidar) are processed by extended
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Kalman filters to develop a head-tailwind profile. An archival paper
describing the wind-shear estimator was published during the period [1].
Real-time guidance for the case in which wind shear encounter has
been encountered was being investigated. Our emphasis shifted from opti-
mal strategies for abort and recovery [2, 3] to strategies based on nonlinear-
inverse-dynamic controllers [4]. The former approach seeks to minimize a
path-following cost function that implicitly maximizes the minimum altitude
during an aborted approach to landing. The latter approach prescribes a
desired rate of climb once an abort has been declared, then generates the
necessary control commands by inverting the aircraft's dynamic model.
The dynamics and control of a twin-jet transport encountering an
intense wind "rotor" were studied [5]. It was found that a physically realiz-
able rotor could roll the aircraft to inverted attitude if left unopposed by lat-
eral control. Similarly, unopposed full rudder deflection could invert the
aircraft in its landing configuration. Conventional linear-quadratic flight
control laws can maintain wings level through such encounters.
A new effort has begun to characterize the dynamics and control of
following-aircraft response to leading-aircraft wake vortices. An aerody-
namic model for a subsonic jet aircraft exposed to vortical flows will be
developed, concentrating on the resultant forces and moments arising from
rotating wind velocity distributions. Methods for designing feedback control
logic that use available control power to minimize the disturbance to the fol-
lowing aircraft's flight path will be derived. This logic will combine features
of optimization and nonlinear-inverse-dynamic control theory to synthesize
practical digital control structures.
Control system robustness is defined as the ability to maintain satis-
factory stability or performance characteristics in the presence of all con-
ceivable system parameter variations. While assured robustness may be
viewed as an alternative to gain adaptation or scheduling to accommodate
known parameter variations, more often it is seen as protection against
uncertainties in plant specification. Consequently, a statistical description
of control system robustness is consistent with what may be known about the
structure and parameters of the plant's dynamic model. Rarely will there be
a single "most robust" controller, as design tradeoffs must inevitably be con-
sidered. For example, stability, settling time, and control usage all may be
of concern; controllers that favor one criterion over the other two have dra-
matically different characteristics.
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Our initial research focused on probabilistic analysis of the stability
and performance robustness of given controllers, while more recent research
has shifted to designing robust controllers [6]. Numerical search using a
genetic algorithm produces robust controllers based on proportional-filter
linear-quadratic regulators with implicit model-following. These controllers
compare favorably to others designed by competing methods (e.g., those that
minimize Hoocost functions). This research is proceeding with applications
to nonlinear control system design and with the incorporation of parallel
processors to speed computations.
Advanced concepts for air traffic management are being developed by
modeling aircraft and air traffic centers as intelligent agents that engage in
principled negotiation [7]. Each agent is characterized as a dynamic system
that carries out declarative, procedural, and reflexive functions [8, 9].
Principled negotiation entails the proposal of alternative flight plans, evalua-
tion of costs and constraints according to separate and shared interests, and
conflict resolution. We are setting the groundwork for an Intelligent
AircraftAirspace System (IAAS). The goal is to identify means by which
ground-based and airborne flight management systems can cooperate to pro-
duce a net gain in the efficiency and robustness of air transportation.
Prior research on modeling an aircraft's aerodynamic characteristics
using neural networks was reported in an archival paper during the period
[10]. It is shown that neural networks provide a promising means of repre-
senting aerodynamics for adaptive control and flight simulation.
Two doctoral theses were completed during the period. Sandeep
Mulgund developed near-optimal nonlinear guidance logic for aircraft
encountering microburst wind shear [11]. Dennis Linse developed the use of
neural networks for aerodynamic modeling mentioned above [12].
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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF 1993-1994 PUBLICATIONS
1. D.A. Stratton and R. F. Stengel, "Robust Kalman Filter Design for
Predictive Wind Shear Detection," IEEE Trans. Aerospace and
Electronic Systems, Vol. 29, No. 4, Oct. 1993, pp. 1185-1194.
Severe, low-altitude wind shear is a threat to aviation safety. Airborne
sensors under development measure the radial component of wind along a
line directly in front of an aircraft. In this paper, optimal estimation theory is
used to define a detection algorithm to warn of hazardous wind shear from
these sensors. To achieve robustness, a wind shear detection algorithm must
distinguish threatening wind shear from less hazardous gustiness, despite
variations in wind shear structure. This paper presents statistical analysis
methods to refine wind shear detection algorithm robustness. Computational
methods predict the ability to warn of severe wind shear and avoid false
warning. Comparative capability of the detection algorithm as a function of
its design parameters is determined, identifying designs that provide robust
detection of severe wind shear.
2. S.S. Mulgund and R. F. Stengel, Target Pitch Angle for the
Microburst Escape Maneuver, J. Aircraft, Vol. 30, No. 6, Nov.-Dec.
1993, pp. 826-832.
Commuter and general aviation aircraft face no less a threat from
microburst wind shear than do large jet transports, yet most studies of wind
shear encounter have neglected them. The effects of microburst wind shear
on a propeller-driven commuter aircraft are considered here. Recovery per-
formance of a commuter-type aircraft in a microburst encounter is examined
using a constant-pitch-attitude strategy and flight-path optimization. The
goals are to identify a suitable target pitch angle for the escape maneuver
and to determine the nature of an optimal escape maneuver for commuter
aircraft. The results demonstrate that the pitch attitude that maximizes climb
rate in a wind shear is strongly dependent on whether the shear is predomi-
nantly a downdraft or a horizontal shear. Simulated recoveries show that the
optimal constant pitch angle depends on the altitude of encounter, the
strength of the microburst, and the initial position of the aircraft relative to
the microburst core. In severe wind shear encounters at very low altitude,
best results are obtained at relatively low pitch angle. Excessively high tar-
get pitch angles subject the aircraft to prolonged periods near stall. Flight
path optimization demonstrates that maximum ground clearance is obtained
by maintaining a low pitch attitude early in the encounter followed by a
gradual pitch-up that ceases when the aircraft exits the wind shear.
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3. S.S. Mulgund and R. F. Stengel, Optimal Recovery from Microburst
Wind Shear, J. Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 16, No. 6,
Nov.-Dec. 1993, pp. 1010-1017.
The flight path of a twin-jet transport aircraft is optimized in a micro-
burst encounter during approach to landing. The objective is to execute an
escape maneuver that maintains safe ground clearance and an adequate stall
margin during the climb-out portion of the trajectory. A cost function penal-
izing rate of climb deviations from a nominal value and the rate of elevator
deflection produces qualitatively good results in a variety of microburst
encounters. The optimal maneuver is a gradual pitch-up that ceases near the
core of the microburst, followed by a slight reduction in pitch attitude in the
tailwind area of the microburst. A minimum airspeed constraint in the opti-
mization prevents excessive airspeed loss in very severe microbursts. The
aircraft equations of motion include short-period dynamics, so that the opti-
mization solves directly for the control surface deflections required to
achieve the optimal flight paths.
4. S.S. Mulgund and R. F. Stengel, "Aircraft Flight Control in Wind
Shear Using Partial Dynamic Inversion," Proceedings of the 1993
American Control Conference, San Francisco, June 1993, pp. 400-
404.
A flight control law based on partial inversion of the longitudinal
dynamics of a twin-jet transport aircraft is presented. The controller is par-
titioned into a slow-time-scale and a fast-time scale to simplify its design.
Three types of controllers are developed.: airspeed/climb rate, ground-
speed/climb rate, and throttle/climb rate. For microburst encounters during
approach to landing, it is found that a combination of airspeed and ground-
speed regulation is quite effective for controlling the flight path to touch-
down. Regulation of groundspeed to a nominal value in the performance-
increasing region of the microburst prevents an inadvertent reduction in
thrust, while regulation of airspeed to a nominal value in the performance-
decreasing area of the microburst prevents excessive airspeed loss. The
throttle/climb rate controller is used for aborted-landing encounters. The
combination of groundspeed and airspeed control is used until the decision is
made to abort the landing, at which point maximum throttle and a specified
positive climb rate are commanded.
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5. D.R. Spilman and R. F. Stengel, "Jet Transport Response to a
Horizontal Wind Vortex," AIAA 31st Aerospace Sciences Meeting,
Reno, AIAA Paper No. 94-0811, Jan. 1994.
The dynamic response of a twin-jet transport aircraft encountering a
single-axis wind vortex on final approach to landing is investigated. Severe
performance degradation and possible ground impact may result from a low-
altitude encounter with a wind rotor, which is formed by strong winds that
flow over a mountain range and roll up on the leeward side of the mountain.
The simulation makes use of the similarities between flow induced over the
aircraft surfaces by angular rates and the flow induced by a wind gradient.
A single-axis vortex model approximates the wind velocity field. Dynamic
simulations illustrate the effects of vortex strength, vortex length, lateral
entry position, vertical entry position, and encounter incidence angle on the
aircraft roll response parameters. Results show that maximum roll rate and
roll angle increase proportionally with vortex strength and vortex length,
until a "saturation length" is reached. Roll response is highly dependent on
entry location: changes in lateral entry position affect maximum roll angle
while changes in vertical entry position affect maximum roll rate. Peak roll
rate and roll angle obtain their largest values at near-zero incidence angles.
The response is highly dependent on the initial conditions of the encounter --
even small variations cause significant changes in aircraft roll response.
6. C.I. Marrison and R. F. Stengel, "The Use of Random Search and
Genetic Algorithms to Optimize Stochastic Robustness Functions,"
Proc. 1994 American Control Conference, Baltimore, Jun. 1994.
Stochastic robustness synthesis is a framework for designing practical
control systems. It uses Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the quality of
candidate designs, and it searches a parameter space to find the best one.
The global minimum of a probabilistic criterion function must be found,
ideally with a minimum number of evaluations. This paper examines two
approaches to minimizing the probabilistic function: random search and a
genetic algorithm. The genetic algorithm is similar to previously published
algorithms but has several modifications to improve its performance, most
notably a clustering analysisat the beginning of each generation. Statistical
tools are incorporated in the search algorithms, allowing intelligent decisions
to be based on the "noisy" Monte Carlo estimates. Performance of the two
methods is demonstrated by application to a 24-dimensional test function.
The genetic algorithm is shown to be significantly better than the random
search for this application. The genetic algorithms is then used to design
compensators for a benchmark problem, producing control laws with excel-
lent levels of stability and performance robustness.
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7. R.F. Stengel and J. P. Wangermann, "Air Traffic Management as
Principled Negotiation Between Intelligent Agents," in Machine
Intelligence in Air Traffic Management, AGARD-CP-538, Neuilly-
sur-Seine, Oct. 1993, pp. 5-1 to 5-10.
Air transportation provides the backbone for passenger transport over
moderate to long distances in the U.S. and much of the world, and it is
becoming an increasingly important mode for short-range travel and cargo
transport as well. There is a growing demand for use of available airspace
and a heightened concern for on-time performance. Demand frequently
exceeds available capacity of the airspace system, causing flight delays,
negative economic impact, and passenger inconvenience [1, 2]. New tech-
nologies are emerging that will make flight Operations both simpler and
more complex. On the one hand, advances hold promise for increasing the
productivity, reliability, and safety of the air transportation system. On the
other, advances in technology introduce uncertainty, increase human work-
load (if not properly implemented), increase the potential for dispute, and
present new challenges for both certification and day-to-day operations.
This paper presents a concept for an Intelligent Aircraft(Airspace System
(IAAS) that could be a focal point for developing air traffic management in
the coming decades. The IAAS would integrate the capabilities of all
ground-based and airbome components of the system (identified as Intelli-
gent Agents) in order to provide increased capacity and maintained or
improved safety. Principled Negotiation is proposed as a framework for
interactions between intelligent agents.
8. R.F. Stengel, "Toward Intelligent Flight Control,"IEEE Trans.
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. 23, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1993, pp.
1699-1717.
Flight control systems can benefit by being designed to emulate func-
tions of natural intelligence. Intelligent control functions fall in three cate-
gories: declarative, procedural, and reflexive. Declarative actions involve
decision-making, providing models for system monitoring, goal planning,
and system/scenario identification. Procedural actions concern skilled
behavior and have parallels in guidance, navigation, and adaptation. Re-
flexive actions are more-or-less spontaneous and are similar to inner-loop
control and estimation. Intelligent flight control systems will contain a
hierarchy of expert systems, procedural algorithms, and computational neu-
ral networks, each expanding on prior functions to improve mission capabil-
ity, to increase the reliability and safety of flight, and to ease pilot workload.
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9. R.F. Stengel, "Intelligent Flight Control Systems," in Aerospace
Vehicle Dynamics and Control, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1994,
pp. 33-80.
The capabilities of flight control systems can be enhanced by design-
ing them to emulate functions of natural intelligence. Intelligent control
functions fall in three categories. Declarative actions involve decision-mak-
ing, providing models for system monitoring, goal planning, and system/
scenario identification. Procedural actions concern skilled behavior and
have parallels in guidance, navigation, and adaptation. Reflexive actions are
spontaneous, inner-loop responses for control and estimation. Intelligent
flight control systems learn knowledge of the aircraft and its mission and
adapt to changes in the flight environment. Cognitive models form an effi'
cient basis for integrating "outer-loop/inner,loop" control functions and for
developing robust parallel-processing algorithms.
10. D. Linse and R. F. Stengel, "Identification of Aerodynamic
Coefficients Using Computational Neural Networks," J. Guidance,
Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 16, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1993, pp. 1018-
1025.
Precise, smooth aerodynamic models are required for implementing
adaptive, nonlinear control strategies. Accurate representations of aerody-
namic coefficients can be generated for the complete flight envelope by
combining computational neural network models with an Estimation-Before-
Modeling paradigm for on-line training. A novel method of incorporating
first-partial-derivative information is employed to estimate the weights in
individual feedforward networks for each coefficient. The method is
demonstrated by generating a model of the normal force coefficient of a
twin-jet transport aircraft from simulated flight data, and promising results
are obtained.
11. S.S. Mulgund, Longitudinal Aircraft Flight in Microburst Wind
Shear, Ph. D_ Thesis, Princeton University, MAE-1995-T, June, 1994.
Severe low-altitude wind variability poses a significant hazard to air-
craft in the terminal area. Longitudinal control strategies to improve flight
safety in microburst wind shear are developed using deterministic trajectory
optimization and feedback control based on the aircraft's nonlinear inverse
dynamics. Optimal state estimates for feedback are computed using
extended Kalman filtering.
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12. D.J. Linse, System Identification for Adaptive Nonlinear Flight
Control Using Neural Networks, Ph. D. Thesis, Princeton University,
MAE- 1997-T, June 1994.
Nonlinear flight control strategies require precise, smooth representa-
tions of the airplane's aerodynamic model. Most nonlinear system identifi-
cation techniques do not provide smooth models across a wide range of
flight conditions. Using computational neural networks -- biologically
inspired, massively parallel computational structures -- to perform general-
ized spline function approximation provides an excellent building block for
identification. A novel training method incorporates first-partial-derivative
information in the network's learning algorithm to constrain the network
function space and to aid in selecting the weights in the network. An esti-
mation-before-modeling structure provides a framework for generating on-
line training information. Identification of a normal-force model for a twin-
jet transport airplane demonstrates the technique. Independent maneuvers
validate the network's performance in untrained regions of the flight enve-
lope. They are adaptive, they learn from examples, and they can provide
excellent approximation for a large class of functions.
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Joint University Program
Aircraft Control in
Wake Vortex Wind Shear
Gregory R. Wold
Dept. of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering
Princeton University
Princeton University J
In the past, there have been a number of fatal incidents attributable to wake
vortex encounters, involving both general aviation and commercial aircraft.
In fact, the wake vortex hazard is considered to be the single dominant
safety issue determining the aircraft spacing requirements at airports.
As the amount of air traffic increases, the number of dangerous encounters
is likely only to increase. It is therefore imperative that a means be found
to reduce the danger. That is the purpose of this research: to use nonlinear
inverse dynamic (NID) control methods in the design of an aircraft control
system which can improve the saftey margin in a wake vortex encounter.
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The Lamb-Oseen Vortex Model
FoEl_e-421IvTI=
where
4W G
F 0 =
_PVGbG
e = 0.0002F 0
The Lamb-Oseen vortex model has been widely used to characterize the
air flow within a wake vortex. The vortex strength is proportional to the
weight of the generating craft, We, and inversely proportional to its speed,
Vc. This highlights the fact that the danger is greatest for smaller craft
following large jet transports near airports, either on takeoff or, more
commonly, on landing.
Although the danger of a crash is greatest for general aviation aircraft
following larger transports, even planes of nearly equal size to the wake-
generating craft can experience hazardous excursions, according to pilots'
subjective ratings.
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Dual Vortex Flowfield
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The wake vortex flowfield is characterized by two vortices with
opposing rotations, one from each wing of the generating craft. A
following airplane, entering the flowfield nearly parallel to the vortex
axis, would initially roll away from the vortex. The pilot's response
would be to counteract the roll to maintain his approach. This would
carry the plane into the vortex core, where the vortex roll would im-
mediately change direction, further rolling the plane, possibly fip-
ping it, and driving it into the strong central downdraft. If the
encounter occured too close to the ground, the pilot would be unable
to recover the airplane, and a crash would ensue.
Vortex decay properties are currently under investigation. Measure-
ments have indicated that the vortex strength does not begin to
decrease immediately, as shown in the plot of dual Lamb-Oseen
vortices above, but stays nearly constant as far as three to six
nautical miles behind the generating craft.
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Nonlinear Inverse Dynamics
Given a nonlinear system of the form
= f(x) + G(x)u
y =Hx
sufficient differentiation of each of the elements of y makes a
component ofu appear. The results can be assembled as
y(d) = v = f*(x) + G*(x)u
For non-singular (3, the inverse system takes the form
= f(x)+ G(x)[G*(x)]-l[v- f* (x)]
where the NID control law is
u= x v-f x
PrincetonUniversity J
Conventional flight control systems are developed assuming the aircraft
dynamics are linear and time invariant about some nominal flight con-
dition. The performance of such linear control systems breaks down in
extreme flight conditions, as the higher-order terms of linearization
become non-negligible. A wake vortex encounter is just such an extreme
condition.
Nonlinear inverse dynamics is one means of better accounting for these
higher-order effects, providing better control over a greater portion of
the flight envelope. An output vector y dependent on x is defined, and
is differentiated with respect to time element by element until the control
effect appears. The assembled derivative vector v becomes a new control
input vector, which can be used to set the system dynamics.
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Difficulties with NID
• Requires a full, d-time differentiable model of
the plant dynamics
• Singularity conditions (for G *-1)must occur
outside the flight envelope
- System could command of excessively large control
deflections
- The control system will break down
• Unstable inverse systems are possible
- Due to the nonlinear equivalent of non-minimum-phase
zel'os
Princeton University J
Nonlinear Inverse Dynamic controllers are characterized by a significantly
higher computational cost than are linear controllers. This is due to the
need for the full, differentiable model of the plant dynamics within the
controller. Such controllers, because of their dependence on the non-
singularity of G*, must also generally be paired with a warning system or
active means of overriding commands in case singularity conditions (such
as excessive angles of attack) are approached. Finally, the control system
design is often based on a reduced plant model, as small effects, if fully
accounted for, can result in system instability.
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• Complete the design and coding of an NID
control system
• Complete an approximation technique for
estimating the aerodynamic effects of a wake
vortex encounter
• Integrate the control system and aerodynamics
into a flight simulator, and evaluate the
controller's effectiveness
Princeton University J
Current and future work willcomplete the design and testing of an NID
controller, using a B-737 flight simulator. This will include code for
estimating the effect of highly non-linear wind shear terms on the aero-
dynamic coefficients of the aircraft. As the NID control system is highly
dependent on the chosen output vector, it is likely that several different
designs will have to be tested before an appropriate one is found.
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Stochastic Robustness: With Stochastic Robustness we are creating tools to
Results, and Conclusions design robust compensators for practical systems.
ChrisMarrison During this year, the Stochastic Robustness researchoo Princeton University
achieved the following results:
• Refined the search tools needed for synthesis.
• Successfully designed robust compensators for the
American Controls Conference benchmark problem.
Joint UniversitiesProgramme • Sucessfully designed robust compensators for a nonlinear
1994 Hypersonic aircraft model with uncertainties in 28 parameters.
Princeton University Jl
__ T_eLaborato_7for ControlandAutomationProblem
The Stochastic Robustness metric defines the robustness
Compensator, G
Plant Structure, H in terms of the probability of the closed-loop system allowing
VectorfUncertainParameters, v a metric to be violated. The binary metric is defined by the
DistributionofUncertainParameters, pr(v) designer and is very flexible; it is able to describe stability,
performance criteria, and actuator usage.
• The Indicator Function
Violation: /[H(v),C_] I, otherwise I[H(v),C_ 0
• The Robustness Metric
P= II[H(v),G] pr(v) dv
v
• The Estimate available from Monte Carlo evaluation
^ I N
_= _m___l/[H(vm), G] vm from pr(v) _2PrincetonUniversity
f Laboratory for Control and Automation _
Random Search
Usual Random Search but with Statistical Tools:
Several statistical tools were developed to improve the
• Reduce Variance by Stratification of V efficiency of the synthesis methods. These tools were
• ComparePairsofSample Points by Bootstrapping combined with random search to create a search algorithm
withfixedsetof v that effectivly searches stochastic cost functions.
• Estimate Optimal N
_o
4_
Performance on a Test Function
Mean of Result
..._...,..._...[..._...[... To quantify the performance of the random search it was usedI--.---M_ (/fired)
o. ..................i ........I-- ---_,,D.:_,_. on a test function. This graph shows the expected result of the
_. _ search as a function of the number of Monte Carlo evaluations.
o..... -_-=:.-.-_.........]...................T........._.........-
__- -3- .... :- .... :_ _ _ .+"
0.2 ......... :.......... : ........ _4.-._ ..... 'T,.... _.." _'__--
Numberof MonteCarloEvaluations
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Genetic Algorithm
Initiallya standardalgorithmwithdecisionmechanis
Number of Evaluations to Assess Next Generation:
N required = Neurrent (_ current/_] desired )2
_ desiredisbasedonthe dispersionof the population
i_ current is based on Bootstrapping
A genetic algorithm was also implemented and used to search
_o the test function. The performance curve is shown here.t.n
Performance of the Baseline Algorithm
' • • i ' • ' i • , • i ............
0._ .................................. | - - + - *_tmdm_lDcvlmion
Mean of Result ' i
0._ ....................................... _.............................
0.4......... ._-_-_----_......... :......... i......... :......... :.........
oa -.,,.._,,_..,.__,._.
_.t ..I..I.X.t._..|..I..I..L.J..L.I..t.J..L.L.t.L.t..L.t. I.t ..t..t.
2000 4000 (_000 8000 10_0 12000 14000
Number of MCEs
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Addition of Clustering and Elite Selection
Case: _,MCEs]o.,_ The genetic algorithm was improved by adding elite selectioni)Baseline _
2) B_stM_r_bero_ty o.:.........,..........•......................_ .._. ....... and a clustering algorithm.
4)3)BestplusBeStTWOclusterMembers0.05.........:......................... o.._,_ Ix &md=ntDevt=flm .
5) Two from Cluster ................... i .... i .....
2 C3ase 4 5
oo Further improvements were made by tuning the parameters withinOx
the algorithm.
Relative Performance of the Random Search
and the Optimized Genetic Algorithm
0.7 _o.,_-.i....[_!!i!i!!!!!ii!iiii!!!!i!iii!i!i!i!i!i!!i!!iI Here the performance of the optimized genetic algorithm is
_i: ' " : " = = " compared with that of the random search. The genetic algorithm
03 is significantly better, taking 10 times fewer Monte Carlo
o_ evaluations to reach the same result.
0.1
: i _ _ ! ::
°_ooo
l_f_zmNumberof bfon_ CarloEvaluations
_rince,o_UniueFsi,yJ_
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RelativeRobustnessof The genetic algorithm was used to design robust compensators
Benchmark Compensator for t_heAmerican Controls Conference benchmark problem.Designedby GeneticAlgorithm
I J: p2 + 0.01 P2 s + 0.01 p2 I The cost function combines probability of instability, probabilityof settling time violation, and probability of actuator saturation.
0.07!iii"iii"•..... .......................................i......-.,a 0.05 ...._....... ";......_.......:,------_....... [.............. i
J1 i-------ii i i i J_ ii I The resulting compensator had a much lower robustness cost
o.o4 ...........................................i i i_ than 10 other designs prepared by other authors, and had a
ii:: i_J_] Robustness research.
o Nmf_
A B C D E F G H I J
Design
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Hypersonic Aircraft Longitudinal Dynamics
Problem Statement
Unstable The synthesis tools were proved on a complex problem by
Fifth Order designing robust compensators for a hypersonic aircraft model
Nonlinear (Based on the Hypersonic Vehicle Simulation Model:
28 Uncertain Parameters Winged-Cone Configuration, NASA TM 102610).
39 Robustness Metrics
oo
ao 28 aerodynamic and physical parameters were taken to be uncertain
Compensator Structures and 39 aspects of performance were considered.
Linear Quadratic Regulators:
Proportional- Integral (10 design parameters) The compensator structures were full state feedback
Proportional - Integral - Filter (12 design parameters) Linear Quadratic regulators
Robustness Cost Functions
WeightedQuadraticSums
Princeton University J7
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....,.Resn!_ofE!gh..!GAR.n.ns.... .
......i .....i ......i ...i ...i ...i .....
_...d__..! i The algorithm was run eight times. The distribution of the cost
of the eight results allows us to estimate the value of the
i _ : :- i .i T_ global minimum2 3 4 5 6 7 $
Estimation of Global Minimum
co by Fitting a Weibull Distribution
i ..... .__----_-----:_
...............................!!_i :::1...... ......................... We can conclude that the best of the runs gave a compensator
i with a robustness cost within one percent of the best robustness
0
0._
_ possible given this compensator structure.o............................................................
o,
............ t ............. _.................. .....-- OA RomulnlW_III Ctffive Pit I ""
1 .S 2 2.5
x
• Best Result is within1% of GlobalMinimum
• ChangingtheWeightsSuppressedCorrespondingProbabilities,
PIFEliminated Spikes j
Princeton University _ 8
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Probabilities Open Loop Base Optimized
Compensator Compensator
J 15A832 2.7744 13405
Pi 0.8160 0.0145 0.0003
Pvo'f_2_ 0.9980 0.9665 0.5165
PV,95o 0.9980 0.7065 0.1730
Pv,Pa5 0.9980 0.7475 0.4698
Pv,_o 0.9980 0.3540 0.1037
Pv,l,r_ 1.0000 03095 0.0297
Pv,l)5 1.0000 0.0`67 0.0127
I_'.DI 0 0.9960 0.0295 0.0115 1'%1
_.o_,o 0.0_0 0.3,63 0.o,5 The final compensator was su_,jected to a full Monte Carlo
Pv, os20 0.0360 0.2112 0.0135
_,,_'_'°' 0._°_ 0._2_°°'820.0,13°°5'8 analysis. The numerical results give a detailed picture of the
PV_I 0.6800 0.1167 0.0650
,_ _ 0.658o 0.1153 0.0_35 Robusmess profile for each aspect of performance.O PVDhO.25 0.8760 0.4490 0.3350
PV,Dh0.S 0.5900 0.1665 0.1065
PV,dT50 0 0.1202 1.0000
PV.dTI00 0 0.1183 0.0658
PV.dF_ 0 0.1163 0.0645
Primo 0 0.1157 0.0640
Pla,T_0 1.(3000 1.00(]0 1 .O000
Ph,Tsl00 1.0000 0.8985 0.8692
Ph.RS0 0.9960 0.9810 0.9888
Ph,RI00 0.9960 0.4,875 0.3645
PI_NMP 0.0280 0.0152 0.0010
l_mo 0.9580 0.9935 0.9832
PI_D20 0.9060 0.2145 0.1815
I_OS_0 0.0300 0.0187 0.0003
Ph,os4o 0.0"280 0.0148 0.0(X)3
I_D.O.S 0.0140 0.1_62 0.0,10
PI_Dtl 0.0140 0.0742 0.0325
_p_gl 0.8380 0.8858 0.9345
g2 0.7760 0.3110 0.4475
PO,DVO_J 0.9280 0.9898 0.0522
I%,DV05 0.8200 0.2118 0.0,80
l_a.dl'5O 0 1.0000 0.0517
Pe._loe 0 0.0997 0.0,95
Pa,d_ 0 0.I0_ 0.0527
_,,, l_,mm o o.09_ o.0,8_.Princeton University 9
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Graphical Tools
o.o,....,....,....,....,....,....,........ Graphical tools also give insight into the nature of the final
] °-_i ::_" compensator's robustness.
°°I: i
Shastic o.o,[
RootLocus ° • ......._._._.;_.. From the stochastic root locus we can see the types of
.. • . .-. . .":_._..-,-
-0.01
..:.::_!_ instability that are possible.
-0.02 il
-0.03
"0.04 _LU.LJ.U.L1J.tJ.tJ.L4.I.4_.l_t.td_LJ.tJJ-4_.IJ. t J.t J.tJ,
-0.04-O,O'J -0,_-0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Stochastic _ The stochastic response envelopes show that in the cases when
ResponseEnvelope the performance metric is violated, the response is still benign.
_. ,-F,-r,T,-r,T.T,-r.T,T.T,-_.r,-r.r,-r.r,-r,-_o.sIm_-..._..i--i...i.-_.-.i.-i...i..i...i..L.L.'..L :.._..._
P : : : : : : : : : : : ."i T i _
Conditional L __ The conditional probability graphs show which parameter
o,6 :..i..i..b.i....:...i..i..._..i...i..i...i..!..f..i..f..i
Probability of °-" --_----_--_---_--_---_--_--._--_----_-----_--variations cause metric violation.
Melric Violation o.2 ..i.._...i.._...i..i...i..,....:...i.._..L..L.
o .i.i,i,i,i,L.i,i,
-0.2 -0.1 0 O. 1 0.2
Extent of Param_tez Variat/o_ ljPrinceton Unioersity 0
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Conclusions
• LQGRs Canbe Robust
• Stochastic Robustness is excellent for the comparison
of compensators
• Stochastic Robusmess is excellent for synthesis
of robust compensators
_o
I,O
• Graphics give useful insights
• Stochastic Robustness synthesis was proven to be flexible
• Synthesis can be conducted efficiently and rigorously
• The tools are ready to be used
Princeton Unioersity ill
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PARALLEL MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
FOR CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN
Wolfgang M. Schubert
JUP Annual Summary
OVERVIEW
I. Motivation
• Why do we need parallel computation ?
II. Parallel Platforms Overview
° Available systems
III. The Monte Carlo Simulation Algorithm
• Classification
• Complexity analysis
IV. Implementation
• Results for KSR1
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]l_e research during the 1993/94 academic year addressed
the design of parallel algorithms for Stochastic Robustness Synthesis
(SRS). SRS uses Monte Carlo Simulation to compute probabilities of
system instability and other design-metric violations. The probabilities
form a cost function which is used by a genetic algorithm (GA). The
GA searches for the stochastic optimal controller.
The existing sequential algorithm was analyzed and
modified to execute in a distributed environment. For this, parallel
approaches to Monte Carlo Simulation and Genetic Algorithms were
investigated. Initial empirical results are available for the KSR1.
93
s Laboratory/or Control and Automation _ .1_
MOTIVATION
"Back-of-an-Envelope" Computation for Stochastic Robustness Synthesis
For GA running on Silicon Graphics Iris Indigo R4000 (16 MFlops) :
• 8 generations to convergence,
• 50 chromosomes / generation,
• 8000 MCE / chromosome.
• => Approximate minimum execution time of 24 hrs !
For same GA running on 64-node SP1 (7.7 GFlops), and assuming :
• maximum scalability,
• small serial overhead,
• little interprocess/interthread communication.
=> Approximate execution time of Iminute !
Real-time design of stochastic optimal controllers is feasible.
_'_ Princeton University /2
Stochastic Robustness Synthesis is computationally
intensive. Execution times to complete one design using Matlab on
an SGI Indigo R4000 have been on the order of several days. Using
high-performance parallel hardware, such as the KSR1, and
appropriate algorithms, controller designs could be computed
within minutes. Additional advantages accrue as execution times
decrease; for example real-time visualization tools for stochastic
root loci could be developed.
94
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Parallel Platforms Overview
Distributed-Memory Machines:
• generally rely on standard message passing paradigm (PVM, MPL,MPI),
• example: IBM POWERparallel SP1.
Shared-Memory Machines:
• tend to use system-specific paradigms,
• example: IBMPower Visualization System (PVS).
Hybrid..Memory Machines:
• can utilize both standard msg passing and shared-memory paradigms,
• examples: KSR1,SHRIMP.
Princeton University ,J3
Most available parallel machines differ dramatically
from each other in hardware and software architectures.
The architectures may be separated into two main groups:
shared-memory, with individual processes/threads
sharing global data; and distributed-memory, with each
process/thread owning its private data and message-passing being
required to exchange the data.
Because software (logical) and hardware (physical)
architectures are separate, some machines are hybrids, i.e. they offer
both shared and distributed memory at the software level. These
hybrid machines are the most versatile and allow for both efficient
task and data parallel algorithms. The hardware selected for this
study includes the KSR1, the IBM POWERparallel SP1/2 and the
Princeton University research computer called SHRIMP (Shared
Really Inexpensive Multi-Processor).
95
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he Monte Carlo Simulation Algorithm
Software Issues
Parallel Partitioning of Stochastic Robustness Synthesis Code:
Classification:
• Task-parallel multiphase-algorithm, with at least two synchronization points
per generation
Princeton Universit, J4
The SRS algorithm can be partitioned into two main
phases. In the first phase, preliminary computations for each
chromosome, or member, in the current GA generation are
performed. During the second phase, a number of Monte
Carlo evaluations are executed for each chromosome to
determine the fitness. Computational tasks within each phase
can be performed in parallel. For example, each Monte Carlo
evaluation is data-independent from all other Monte Carlo
evaluations in the current GA generation. Load imbalances
occur if some processors are idle at some time during execution.
Because the execution time for each Monte Carlo evaluation is
stochastic, a dynamic scheduler is required during that phase of
the algorithm. The scheduler will distribute work load such that
all processors are used evenly. The algorithm can so far be
classified as being task-parallel with the indicated two
synchronization points.
96
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T]he Monte Carlo Simulation Algorithm
Complexity Analysis
Theoreticalspeedup compared toactual speedup (simulated on serialmachine):
N = 1000, P$ = 0.3, c = 2.3
0,2
.... j_ ............ L
MeasuredSpeedup |
- - o- -TheoreticalSpeedupI
0.15
°'' .
o.o5 -",_;"
0.05 0.1 0.15 0,2
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A complexity analysis of the Monte Carlo Simulation
phase of the SRS algorithm yields a theoretical "speed-up" curve.
N is the number of Monte Carlo evaluations per chromosome, L is
the number of processors used. Other parameters enter into the
analysis, such as the probability of metric violation and the
complexity and logical flow structure of an individual Monte
Carlo evaluation. The ideal (100% load balancing, no communications)
graph would be a 45-degree line (i.e. speed-up equals L). If stochastic
load balancing techniques are neglected, the efficiency (theoretical
speed-up divided by ideal speed-up) is less than 100%. In this
particular example, the theoretical efficiency was considerably less
than 100%. The theoretical results were validated using empirical
results from the KSR1.
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PROBLEM STATEMENT
,-).- Provide Assistance in AOR-200's Distributed
Computing Effort
• Evaluate Distributed Hardware Platforms.
• Evaluate Distributed Software Environments.
• Recommend:
I[ the appropriate hard-/software,
a plan to integrate existing legacy applications, and
guidelines & standards for future application development.
Princeton University J6
Research during the summer of 1994 at FAA headquaters
in Washington, DC, addressed the Operation Research (AOR)
Service's need for a distributed computing environment. Different
commercially available software and hardware platforms for
client/server and parallel computing were evaluated. The focus was
on IBM and KSR for hardware and OSF/DCE and OMG/CORBA
compliant products for software.
98
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SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURES
+ Comparison of Commercial Products
ENCINA (DCE) DAIS (CORBA) ' Orbix (CORBA)
Available for SunOS, • Available for SunOS, IRIX, • Available for SunOS, HP-I_E_,
HP-UX, Ultrix and AIX. HP-UX, Solaris, VMS, DOS Solaris, IRIX, MS NT, AIX
OS/2 and Windows. OSF/I and UnixWare.
Supports TCP/IP and • Supports TCP/IP, UDP/IP, • Supports TCWIP.
SNA. X.25 and OSI.
DCE Name Service. • DAIS Trading Service. • No Trading/Name Service.
Exception Handling *Resilience and Exception ° Exception Handling Featur,
Features. Handling Features.
DCE Security Service. • DAIS Security Extension. • Orbix Filters.
DCE Threads. • Supports multi-threading. • Supports multi-threading.
• DAIS Factory Service.
Princeton University _7
A comparison of hardware platforms established the
IBM SP2 as the most economical commercially available option for
its large software base and best price-performance ratio. The
software architecture comparison was between the Open Software
Foundation's Distributed Computing Environment (OSF/DCE) and
the Object Management Group's Common Object Request Broker
Architecture (OMG/CORBA). The table provides a detailed
comparison between three commercially available products, one
DCE-based and the other two CORBA-based. Overall, OMG/CORBA
satisfies AOR's criteria better. It ideally allows for rapid prototyping
and offers an object-oriented design.
The recommendations ask for testing ICL s DAIS (CORBA),
Iona's Orbix (CORBA). A pilot coding project involving a couple of
AOR's applications should be undertaken in the next few months.
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Intelligent Aircraft/Airspace Systems
John P. Wangermann
Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey
Projections of future air traffic predict at least a doubling of the
number of revenue passenger miles flown by the year 2025. To meet this
demand, an Intelligent Aircraft/Airspace System (IAAS) has been
proposed. The IAAS operates on the basis of principled negotiation
between intelligent agents.
i00
Studies of the future air traffic continue to predict significant
growth rates. The Federal Aviation Administration's 1992 report
predicted an annual growth rate of 4.9% for the US aviation system
to the year 2003. If this growth rate continues to the year 2025 the
traffic will be more than three times today's levels.
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MOTIVATION
Growth In Revenue Passenger Miles
2500
[] 1990Historic | I_;_:[
2000 ....................... D 1.991Historic IF....... I,"_,t-I
L] 1992 Forecast I _,."J:l
[_ 1500 ....................... _ +_!:;!:i!;_.::!':!'..!:i:,'_iI.:: .......
, 1000500-_ :i::_:i:Jl
Oomes_¢ Internationel System
A_In_al Gcowth(1991.2_) 4.1% 7.0% 4.9%
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The aircraft/airspace system today consists of many agents,
such as airlines, control facilities, and aircraft. All the agents are
becoming increasingly capable as technology develops. These
capabilities should be exploited to create an Intelligent Aircraft/
Airspace System (IAAS) that would meet the predicted traffic levels
of 2005.
All agents could contribute to the IAAS through principled
negotiation, a method that was first proposed to produce agreements
that were beneficial to all parties in negotiation. In principled
negotiation an agent would focus on the interests of all agents and
could propose options for mutual gain. These options would be
assessed using objective criteria. In this way any agent can propose
changes to all aspects of a flight (departure runway, routing,
altitude profile, etc.) that could increase airspace capacity. The
options found by several agents with distinct capabilities are likely
to be better than those found by a single agent. By applying these
options the IAAS should have higher capacity, better safety levels,
and more adaptability than today's system.
_ Laboratory for Control and AutomationINTELLIGENT AIRCRAFT/AIRSPACE SYSTEM__'_
• Integrate airborne sensors and computers into the
traffic management system
• Allow all agents to contribute
• Principled Negotiation
- Focus on Interests of all agents
- Search for Options for Mutual Gain
- Assess options using Objective Criteria
* The IAAS should
- be safer
- have higher capacity
- be more adaptable
_,_ than today's system j
. Princeton University
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The agents in the IAAS can be classified according to their
negotiating behavior. Agents such as aircraft and operators
generally attempt to maximize some utility function. This function
could reflect profit, fuel usage, deviation from planned arrival time,
or a combination of these and other factors. Traffic management
agents (TrMAs) exhibit satisficing behavior. They will accept a
flight trajectory provided it meets certain parameters, such as
minimum separation from other aircraft.
A maximizer will choose options from a set of feasible options
(those options that the agents are capable of performing). If two
maximizers are in negotiation, any option proposed must be in the
feasible set of both agents forthe agents to be able to reach
agreement. The option should also have a higher utility for both
agents compared to the present plan.
If a maximizer is negotiating with a satisficer, it must propose
options that lie within the satisficer's satisfactory set (those options
that would meet the satisficer's criteria for acceptance). The
agreements reached will be influenced by the utility function of the
agent (shown as contours for the maximizers).
_ LabaratoryforControl and Automation
TYPES OF NEGOTIATION
Option Space
(Trajectories)
A/C - Maximizer
AJC1 - Maximizer
Maximizer _ _OK ____!"'/
ATC - Satisficer
A]C2 _ jregion indicates chosen
Overlapping Current
possibleconflict option
NotOK M "_ _
Boundary_lefinedby
Boundariesdefined Cohtoursof traffic,weather, \by performanceenvelope, equalutility systemstatus etc.
physicalconstraints Overlappingregion
indicatesagreement
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Maximizers will use many different factors in their
assessment of an option. This behavior can be represented using
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory. The values of the different factors
are combined through a weighting matrix to calculate the utility of
the option. The components of the weighting matrix are varied
according to the state of the agent. For example, an aircraft that
departed late may place higher weight on minimizing flight time,
while an on-time aircraft weight fuel usage more heavily.
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MULTI-ATTRIBUTE UTILITY THEORY
• Agents choose from a set of options 0={c_,o$, ..., o_}
• Options assessed against attributes A={aijt$, ..... _am}
• Value of each attribute calculated for each option.
- Values for oI are {al(oi)_a_(oi), ..... ,am(Oi)}=A(ol)
• Assign weights to each attribute W={wl,wz, ..... ,w m}
- Weights are dynamic; they change according to the
identified scenario and goals of the agent
- Heuristic rules (expert system) set weights
• Calculate the utility of each option
U(oi) ----_k(Oi).W
* Choose the option with the maximum utility
_ , Princeton University J
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In the IAAS, TrMAs will still have to approve flights through
controlled airspace. TrMAs are therefore likely to receive many
proposals from both aircraft and operators for changes to all aspects
of an aircraft's flight. TrMAs must also rapidly detect conflicts and
other hazardous situations, which will impact negotiation. To meet
these needs, a TrMA must be able to quickly assess present and
future traffic situations and make decisions accordingly.
This type of situation can be tackled using decision trees. A
decision tree describes a sequence of tests of various factors of a
situation. The outcome of these tests determines the decision taken.
The tree is constructed from a training set of examples and desired
decisions. Decision trees are well suited to classification problems.
When a TrMA assesses a traffic situation it has to classify the
situation as safe or unsafe. If a test set consisting of safe and unsafe
situations and their attributes is supplied,a decision tree for a TrMA
could be constructed.
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Decision trees can be constructed using a number of different
algorithms. Algorithms such as ID3 and C4.5 are based on
univariate tests, i.e. only one attribute is tested at each node of the
tree. Other algorithms such as OC1 have been developed that allow
multivariate testing at each node. All the algorithms aimto produce
trees that have the least number of nodes (tests) needed to correctly
classify the set of test examples.
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ID3
OCI Hyperplane giving 0 impurity Atwibut¢2
R_c2
AtL2 []O l.f o
0 0 [] []
AUrt_bute1 (X1) l_ug_l [ Rt_c2
Attribute1
121 [] D
[] []
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OC1 and ID3 were used to create decision trees that classified
two-aircraft scenarios. The aircraft had random positions within a
volume of airspace and velocities (within certain bounds). They
could execute one maneuver (turn, climb, accelerate). The starting
time, duration, and maneuver rate were all randomly distributed.
The decision-maker (the TrMA) had perfect information on
the velocity, position, and maneuver of each aircraft, and an
estimate of maneuver start time. It did not have information on the
maneuver rate or duration. The trees were built using training sets
of 5000 examples, of which 300 were class A, the rest class S. The
trees were tested on test sets of 200 scenarios.
OC1 was significantly easier to use than ID3, as ID3 requires
the user to categorize the attribute values of each scenario. OC1
can use the raw attribute values. OC1 can also produce trees that
are either axis parallel (univariate) or oblique (multi-variate). Axis
parallel trees were found to produce higher classification accuracies
(see slide). The classification accuracy for class S cases was above
99% and betwen 75% and 90% for class A scenarios.
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OBLIQUE vs. AXIS PARALLEL TREES
Performance of Oblique and
Axis Parallel Trees
100 ............. I .... _ ....
99.5 ................ -................. ._................ _........ ._......; ................
_Q ............................................i..............i
i iI '''I
" oo ? . i
98.5 ..... -_....... !................. _................ _.....
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Experimental work to date has investigated different aspects
of the IAAS, such as the A* algorithm, decision trees, etc. In order
to test the IAAS concept more fully, a computer simulation is needed
which represents accurately essential features such as principled
negotiation between agents, invention of options for mutual gain,
and assessment of options.
The simulation is being constructed using CLIPS, an expert
system shell that provides object-oriented, procedural, and rule-
based programming facilities. (CLIPS was developed at NASA JSC.
It is written in C to provide portability between platforms and ease
of interface with C and other languages.)
Laboratoryfor Control and AutomationOMPUTER MODEL REQUIREMENTS
The application must model
* principled negotiation
* decision-making distributed between agents
• option generation and assessment
The application should
• allow different scenarios to be tested
• display the state of the agents and the progress of
negotiations
* allow negotiation behavior to be varied.
Princeton University
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Principled negotiation between agents can be naturally
represented as message passing between objects in an object-
oriented program (OOP) environment. The class hierarchy for IAAS
agents can be based on their type of negotiating behavior (see slide).
An agent that is an instance of a fully-equipped aircraft inherits the
same basic negotiating behavior as other maximizers such as an
airline.
--.-_ Laboratory for Control and Automation
OOP AND IAAS _'_
* ObjL_ts = agents
• Class hierarchy AGFIlVr
i
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The declarative functions of an agents are well represented by
an expert system. Procedural functions, such as the generation of
options for mutual gain, are executed as a side-effect of the firing of
rules in the expert system. A portion of the rule-base that governs
negotiating behavior is shown in the slide. This rule base is used by
both satisficers and maximizers, but the procedural functions called
may be very different.
CLIPS allows rule bases to pattern match on the slot values
of objects as well as facts. This enables an efficient program to be
developed where a common rule-base can be used for all the agents
without the need to program separate rule bases for each agent.
The rule bases can then execute different procedural functions
F Laboratory for Control and Automation
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CLIPS is being embedded in a Think C program running on a
Macintosh Quadra 950. The C wrapper produces the graphical
display and controls the program execution. At this stage a file-
based system will be used for user input, but a menu-based
graphical user interface could be built at a later stage.
Another benefit of CLIPS is that a function written in C can
be embedded into CLIPS. This may be required for more complex
procedural functions.
.---.- Laboratory for Control and Automation _%_
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The negotiation expert system, class hierarchy, state update
routines, C-CLIPS transfer routines, and display routines have been
implemented. The next phase of work will define a syntax for
describing options, and procedural functions to invent and assess
options will be implemented.
---.- Laboratoryfor Control and Automation
PROGRESS
• Completed
- Basic Display Routines
- State Update
- Basic Class Hierarchy
- Routines to transfer information from CLIPS to
Think C
- Negotiation Rule Base Implemented
* Next Stage
- Write Functions to
,, Invent Options for Mutual Gain
**Assess Option using Objective Criteria
- Develop a syntax to describe options
Princeton University J
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